Featured Posting: GMO's James Montier: Seven Immutable Laws of Investing

From John Mauldin's Outside the box article (You can subscribe to the article here: http://www.johnmauldin.com/outsidethebox/the-seven-immutable-laws-of-investing - Free lah) feature's GMO's James Montier piece this week.

• The Seven Immutable Laws of Investing
  
  James Montier
  
  In my previous missive I concluded that investors should stay true to the principles that have always guided (and should always guide) sensible investment, but I left readers hanging as to what I believe those principles might actually be. So, now, for the moment of truth, I present a set of principles that together form what I call The Seven Immutable Laws of Investing.
  
  They are as follows:
  
  1. Always insist on a margin of safety
  2. This time is never different
  3. Be patient and wait for the fat pitch
  4. Be contrarian
  5. Risk is the permanent loss of capital, never a number
  6. Be leery of leverage
  7. Never invest in something you don’t understand

I like 3,5,6,7

LOL! I know.. how can I leave out MoS? Well I find the Margin Of Safety so badly abused nowadays but that's my flawed opinion. Don't get misunderstood. It's not that I think MoS is flawed, in fact I agree with it but like I said, it's so badly abused by investors who tweaks the MoS to their own requirement.

Anyway, here's James Montier No.3, 5, 6 and 7.

3. Be Patient and Wait for the Fat Pitch

Patience is integral to any value-based approach on many levels. As Ben Graham wrote, “Undervaluations caused by neglect or prejudice may persist for an inconveniently long time, and the same applies to inflated prices caused by over-enthusiasm or artificial stimulants.” (And there can be little doubt that Mr. Market’s love affair with equities is based on anything other than artificial stimulants!)

However, patience is in rare supply. As Keynes noted long ago, “Compared with their predecessors, modern investors concentrate too much on annual, quarterly, or even monthly valuations of what they hold, and on capital appreciation… and too little on immediate yield … and intrinsic worth.” If we replace Keynes’s “quarterly” and “monthly” with “daily” and “minute-by-minute,” then we have today’s world.

Patience is also required when investors are faced with an unappealing opportunity set. Many investors seem to suffer from an “action bias” – a desire to do something. However, when there is nothing to do, the best plan is usually to do nothing. Stand at the plate and wait for the fat pitch.

5. Risk Is the Permanent Loss of Capital, Never a Number

I have written on this subject many times. In essence, and regrettably, the obsession with the quantification of risk (beta, standard deviation, VaR) has replaced a more fundamental, intuitive, and important approach to the subject. Risk clearly isn’t a number. It is a multifaceted concept, and it is foolhardy to try to reduce it to a single figure.

To my mind, the permanent impairment of capital can arise from three sources: 1) valuation risk – you pay too much for an asset; 2) fundamental risk – there are underlying problems with the asset that you are buying (aka value traps); and 3) financing risk – leverage.

By concentrating on these aspects of risk, I suspect that investors would be considerably better served in avoiding the permanent impairment of their capital.

6. Be Leery of Leverage

Leverage is a dangerous beast. It can’t ever turn a bad investment good, but it can turn a good investment bad. Simply piling leverage onto an investment with a small return doesn’t transform it into a good idea. Leverage has a darker side from a value perspective as well: it has the potential to turn a good investment into a bad one! Leverage can limit your staying power and transform a temporary impairment (i.e., price volatility) into a permanent impairment of capital.

While on the subject of leverage, I should note the way in which so-called financial innovation is more often than not just thinly veiled leverage. As J.K. Galbraith put it, “The world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version.” Anyone with familiarity of the junk bond debacle of the late 80s/early 90s couldn’t have helped but see the striking parallels with the mortgage alchemy of recent years! Whenever you see a financial product or strategy with its foundations in leverage, your first reaction should be skepticism, not delight.

7. Never Invest in Something You Don’t Understand

This seems to be just good old, plain common sense. If something seems too good to be true, it probably is. The financial industry has perfected the art of turning the simple into the complex, and in doing so managed to extract fees for itself! If you can’t see through the investment concept and get to the heart of the process, then you probably shouldn’t be investing in it.

Another View On China's Real Estate

Here is another view on China's real estate.

Highlighted by John Mauldin in his out-of-the-box posting. The China Files (Special Project): Real Estate. (ps as mentioned by John "Today's analysis comes courtesy my friends at STRATFOR, a global intelligence company. They've got a free newsletter as well, for which I encourage you to sign up by clicking here )

• .... The Recovery Bubble
  
  Following a temporary drop toward the end of 2007, land prices rose steadily, then began surging again with Beijing's stimulus package and a flood of easy credit in 2009. With much of this money flowing into the real estate sector, major beneficiaries included large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in speculative real estate and housing investment, contributing to the inflating bubble. Among the 10 highest-priced land purchases in major cities in the first half of 2009, 60 percent went to SOEs.
  
  Paradoxically, as the global financial crisis continues, China sees little choice but to loosen its monetary policy even further, fearing the opposite would curtail economic growth and result in massive unemployment, which could lead to social instability. Beijing knows that one of the country's underlying economic problems continues to be an overheated real estate market, but it also knows that the real long-term solution - limiting the flow of cash and credit - could have dire socio-economic ramifications. Meanwhile, real estate developers, government officials and investors continue to speculate on real estate, raising land and housing prices.
  
  As housing prices continue to rise, a parallel trend is manifesting itself - rising vacancy rates in urban areas. A 2009 report by the Shanghai Yiju Real Estate Research Institute revealed that, by the end of 2008, the average vacancy rate for "commodity housing" (as opposed to welfare housing) in Beijing was 16.64 percent, and vacancies reached as high as 30 percent in some districts. Most of these vacant houses, however, are not unsold ones. They have been purchased by investors as speculative investments. While there are fewer and fewer ordinary people who can afford to buy houses, there is still excessive demand for investment housing - pressure that continues to drive up the prices.
  
  This closed loop in the Chinese real estate market is facilitated by the country's political and bureaucratic system. In China, all land is initially owned by the state, and local governments have the sole authority to sell it. And income from property taxes and land sales are a primary source of revenue for local jurisdictions. According to estimates by the State Council's Development and Research Center, tax revenue from the land in some jurisdictions accounts for 40 percent of the local budget. Moreover, net income from land sales accounts for more than 60 percent of the local governments' extra-budgetary revenue. The soft budget and lack of accountability to the people reinforces the local governments' incentive to expand their real estate investments without much concern for cost or impact on public services.
  
  Economic performance also is the prime prerequisite for bureaucratic advancement, which gives local officials the incentive to generate as much revenue as possible through land auctions. And this generally involves a level of collusion - and corruption - among government officials, real estate developers and investors.
  
  One typical strategy is for a developer to buy a big chunk of urban land from the local government but leave the land undeveloped, or build on only a small portion of it, thereby keeping the housing supply limited. Despite various state policies to lower land prices in order to make homes more affordable, local government officials and real estate developers control the land auctions. When a lower sale price is dictated from above, it is easy enough for the local sponsors to officially deem the auction a failure. Even when the developer does build houses on the property, a speculative investor, working hand in hand with the developer and government officials, can bribe both parties to ensure that he can buy all the houses at a low volume price and keep them off the market, thereby maintaining a limited supply and high prices.
  
  Another factor that enters the equation is a cultural one. The Chinese people generally prefer to buy new houses, as opposed to renting homes or buying secondary houses in which people have already lived. Indeed, in urban areas, marriage proposals often include a promise to buy a new commodity house. As a result, the secondary housing market remains very small in comparison (due also to fewer available bank loans for lived-in houses and the complicated process involved in transferring ownership).
  
  All of these factors contribute to the burgeoning real estate bubble - and make it difficult to predict when that bubble will burst. With 70 percent of real estate investment in China coming from bank loans, a dramatic drop in land values could send shock waves throughout the economy. There are already signs of decline. In Shenzhen, one of China's first-tier cities, real estate prices have been dropping for the past two years (30 percent for housing), and many developers and speculators have suffered great losses. The threat looms in other large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai and may be emerging in many second-tier cities as well.
  
  Given the current global economy and the economic balancing act it must maintain domestically, Beijing has few good choices. It must keep enough cash flowing to maintain economic growth and social stability in the short term while tightening credit to avoid a tsunami of bad loans and a market collapse over the long term. Certainly, Beijing does not want to face the kind of collapse in the housing market that Japan experienced in the 1990s, which triggered a financial crisis and more than a decade of economic malaise.
  
  But in China's real estate, as in most sectors of this vast and complex land, implementing and enforcing prudent regulation has never been an easy task
  
  

Who Is Going To Lend US Money To Fund Its $2 Trillion Deficit?

Pimco's Bill Gross talked about it in his newsletter Staying Rich in the New Normal

• The immediate question is who is going to buy all of this debt? Estimates suggest gross Treasury issuance of up to $3 trillion this calendar year and net offerings close to $2 trillion – almost four times last year’s supply. Prior to 2009, it was enough to count on the recycling of the U.S. trade/current account deficit to fund Treasury borrowing requirements. Now, however, with that amount approximating only $500 billion, it is obvious that the Chinese and other surplus nations cannot fund the deficit even if they were fully on board – which they are not. Someone else has got to write checks for up to $1.5 trillion additional Treasury notes and bonds...... (do read rest of Bill Gross letter here )

Henry Blodget acknowledged the debt issue back in May in his editorial on Business insider highlighting what John Mauldin had been saying.Why Are Rates Rising? Maybe Lenders Think We're Screwed

• Second, long-term rates are going up because traders are realizing that the world's big economies will need to issue trillions of dollars of new debt to pay for all their deficit spending...and there's just not enough dumb money in the world. Put differently, where is all this money going to come from?
  
  John Mauldin ran some numbers on this over the weekend. The US is in trouble. Japan's in trouble. Germany's in trouble. The UK's in trouble. Spain is in trouble. European banks are in trouble. All of the aforementioned countries, including the US, will be running deficits of over 10% a year, likely for several years to try to stave off economic collapse.
  
  The US deficit alone will eat $1.8 trillion next year, forcing the US to issue $1.8 trillion of new debt. When you go out a few years and add in the other countries, the amount of new money required gets very big very fast. And, again, the big question is...where is that money going to come from?
  
  Here's John Mauldin:
  
  The world is going to have to fund multiple trillions in debt over the next several years. Pick a number. I think $5 trillion sounds about right. $3 trillion is in the cards for the US alone, if current projections are right.
  
  The US trade deficit is now down to under $350 billion a year. The Fed can monetize a trillion [buy debt directly from the Treasury, thus printing new money]. Maybe... US savings are going to go up, but where is the incentive to buy ten-year debt at 3.5%? Four-year debt under 2% doesn't do much for your savings growth. Even with monetization and the Chinese buying our debt with the dollars we send them, that still leaves the bond market about $1.5 trillion short, give or take $100 billion...
  
  I think the bond market is looking at the mountain of debt that will have to be somehow sold and wondering where such a colossal sum will come from. Where do you find $10 trillion in the next ten years for US debt?
  
  And that is just for US government debt. $5 trillion for new global debt in the next two years? In a deleveraged world? How much will the other countries need? What about money needed for businesses and mortgages and credit cards and so on?
  
  If you add $10 trillion to the current $11.3 trillion (including Social Security trust funds, etc.), that totals $21 trillion in 2019. Let's be generous and suggest that interest rates will only be an average of 5%. That would be an interest-rate expense of over $1 trillion. That is 25% of projected revenues and 20% of expected expenses. And that assumes you have nominal growth of over 4% for the next ten years. If growth is less, tax revenues will be less.

Scary? Or perhaps you think that all these folks are simply singing the same tune.

Here is another set of opinion from famed Canadian fund manager Eric Sprott of Sprott Asset Management

Some bits of what Eric wrote...

• The US government raised $705 billion worth of new debt in 2008. The debt was raised to pay for a $455 billion budget deficit and $250 billion in “supplemental appropriations” for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2009, the US government will (and must) sell $2.041 trillion in new debt. This debt will pay for a projected budget deficit of $1.845 trillion, supplemental appropriations of $196 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan, a fund for pandemic flu response and a line of credit to the IMF. In fiscal 2009, the United States must find buyers for almost three times the debt that was issued last year.
• Given the current state of the economy, it seems frighteningly apparent that a threefold increase in the debt purchased by the account holders listed above is a mathematical impossibility. There is simply not enough money in the present economy to support a tripling bond issue in the normal course of business. To confirm this, we have grouped together similar debt holders in order to assess their potential buying capability for fiscal 2009, which ends on September 30th.
• The Federal Reserve’s policy of Quantitative Easing is failing. The US budget is ludicrous, spending is out of control, spending promises are out of control, the world knows it - and we know it. For all the pundits who see the economy improving over the next year, we invite you to explain to us how this debt crisis will resolve itself without significant turmoil. We’ve tabulated the numbers above - and they do not lie. ( source: here - recommended reading. :D )

And here is my favourite pun... Where Is Ze Moola babe?

How now my dearest brown cow?

Unemployment, Unsustainable Trend In Debt And Taxes

Featured article on John Mauldin's newsletter: Faith-Based Economics (subscription is required - but it's free)

Couple of issues stand out.

John writes about unemployment numbers and questions if the numbers should be a lagging indicator.

• The typical pundit keeps telling us unemployment is a lagging indicator, and that the recovery will be well under way before it shows up in the job numbers. Therefore, you should buy what they are selling, because the recovery is on its way. But that may not be the case this time. One of my favorite reads, when I get to see it, is the economic analysis from Bridgewater. They are among the best thinkers anywhere, and everyone who follows them gives them a great deal of credence. This is what they wrote about unemployment being a lagging indicator last month:
  
  "Normally, labor markets lag the economy because incremental spending transactions are financed via debt, stimulated by interest rate cuts. But as long as credit remains frozen, spending will require income, and income comes from jobs. And debt service payments are made out of income. Therefore, in a deleveraging environment job growth becomes an important leading, causal indicator of demand and other economic conditions.
  
  "... The bounce in the economy and the stabilization in markets reflect government actions that are big enough to impact near-term growth rates, but are not sufficiently directed at the root problem of excessive indebtedness to produce permanent healing. The deterioration in employment markets will continue because companies' profit margins are so deeply damaged that a little bounce in growth won't do much to alter their need to cut costs. This deterioration in labor markets will undermine demand and continue to pressure loan losses, which will keep the pressure on the banks and elevate the cost of capital for tentative borrowers, inhibiting credit expansion."
  
  This again illustrates the problem of using past performance to project future results. You have to look at the underlying conditions in order to get a real comparison, and we have not seen a deleveraging recession in the US for 80 years. Using the past data in today's world is statistical masturbation: it may make you feel good, but it is not producing anything really useful, and may be harmful to your portfolio.

How now my dearest Brown Cow?

John then writes about the debt and tax issue. And like Warren Buffett has stated recently, sooner rather late, the taxes has to increase. (ps. do give the forbes article a read. )

• An Unsustainable Trend in Debt
  
  This week, the federal government published two important reports on long-term budgetary trends. They both show that we are on an unsustainable path that will almost certainly result in massively higher taxes. By 2016 we will have to fund Social Security out of general revenues, as the surplus we now have will be gone. And there are no trust funds. They are a myth. It as if I wrote myself a check for $2 trillion and then declared I was worth $2 trillion. The money is just not there. Social Security makes Bernie Madoff look like a small-time crook.
  
  And Medicare is in far worse shape. For those with the stomach, you can read Bruce Bartlett's analysis at http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/14/taxes-social-security-opinions-columnists-medicare.html. He estimates that taxes will have to go up by 81% if we are to pay the obligations as they now stand.
  
  Now that is unsustainable. It won't happen. And as the saying goes, if something is unsustainable, at some point it will stop. No getting around it. Long before we get there, change you will not like will be forced on the US.
  
  The following headline caught my eye: "Obama Says US Long-Term Debt Load is 'Unsustainable.'" Yet they announced a $1.8 trillion deficit, which is really going to be at least $2 trillion, and are getting ready to pass health-care programs that will mean at least a trillion in deficits for as long as one can project.
  
  How will they pay for it? Even getting rid of the Bush tax cuts will only produce a few hundred billion a year, which is nowhere near enough. They project much lower medical costs in the future, because they assume they are going to figure out ways to cut costs and make medical care more efficient. As if no one has ever tried that.
  
  Yes, there are some savings on the margin; but the only way you really cut costs is to ration health care, especially health care in the last year of life, which is about 30% of health-care expenses. That is going to be very tough in the US. But when faced with a real budget crisis, the choices are going to be stark. And that crisis is coming if we do not control spending.
  
  You cannot propose massive increases in spending without either creating crushing debt that the markets will simply not allow, pushing interest rates much higher and really slowing growth and hurting the economy. It is a simple fact that you cannot increase the debt-to-GDP ratio without limit.
  
  We found the limit on personal and corporate debt this past year. We pushed the limits until the system crashed. And now the US government wants to basically do the same thing. They are planning to see where the limits on government debt-to-GDP will be. Unless cooler and more rational heads in the Democratic Party prevail, this is not going to be pretty. Sometime in the middle of the next decade we will hit the wall, and it will make the current crisis pale in comparison.
  
  The only way to solve the problem is to grow GDP more rapidly than debt, and for that to happen you have to have policies which are shaped for the growth of the economy or massive savings by consumers. And right now we have neither. Cap and trade is hugely anti-growth. So are high corporate taxes, and Obama is proposing to effectively raise corporate taxes by closing loopholes for income earned outside the US. Much better would be to lower the overall corporate level to a competitive world rate and then require the offshore income to be taxed. A lower rate would actually increase tax revenues.
  
  Looming protectionism worldwide is a problem. (See the article at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30758018 .) Towns in Ontario, Canada with a population totalling 500,000 have effectively barred US contractors from doing business with them, in retaliation for job losses stemming from US protectionism in the stimulus plan. That movement is spreading. A US steel mill with 600 union jobs will have to close down because its owners are not US-based, and thus it is not technically a US supplier. They are losing jobs to US-owned mills -- but those are US jobs. The insanity goes on and on. As I have written for many years, the one thing that really gets me worried is protectionism. That can make this very significant recession into a depression quicker than you can imagine. Bad ideas have bad consequences.
  
  All in all, we face some very difficult decisions, not just in the US but all over the developed world. Ironically, the less developed nations will have fewer problems and on a relative basis will likely grow much faster than the developed world. But, multi-trillion-dollar deficits and massive new programs are not the right answer.
  
  Obama is right: the debt load is unsustainable. Let's hope he will do more than talk, and show some budget restraint.
  
  

Massive Warning On East Europe Yet Again

Blogged earlier this month, The Potential Global Meltdown (Other postings : Russia Crisis Worsens As Ruble Tumbles , Russia Crisis Worsens , Another Russian Crisis? and Europe Is In Its Deepest Recession!

On this week's John Mauldin's newsletter, While Rome Burns, John highlights the risk again in Europe.

• The Risk in Europe
  
  I mentioned last week that European banks are at significant risk. I want to follow up on that point, as it is very important. Eastern Europe has borrowed an estimated $1.7 trillion, primarily from Western European banks. And much of Eastern Europe is already in a deep recession bordering on depression. A great deal of that $1.7 trillion is at risk, especially the portion that is in Swiss francs. It is a story that could easily be as big as the US subprime problem.
  
  In Poland, as an example, 60% of mortgages are in Swiss francs. When times are good and currencies are stable, it is nice to have a low-interest Swiss mortgage. And as a requirement for joining the euro currency union, Poland has been required to keep its currency stable against the euro. This gave borrowers comfort that they could borrow at low interest in francs or euros, rather than at much higher local rates.
  
  But in an echo of teaser-rate subprimes here in the US, there is a problem. Along came the synchronized global recession and large Polish current-account trade deficits, which were three times those of the US in terms of GDP, just to give us some perspective. Of course, if you are not a reserve currency this is going to bring some pressure to bear. And it did. The Polish zloty has basically dropped in half compared to the Swiss franc. That means if you are a mortgage holder, your house payment just doubled. That same story is repeated all over the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
  
  Austrian banks have lent $289 billion (230 billion euros) to Eastern Europe. That is 70% of Austrian GDP. Much of it is in Swiss francs they borrowed from Swiss banks. Even a 10% impairment (highly optimistic) would bankrupt the Austrian financial system, says the Austrian finance minister, Joseph Proll. In the US we speak of banks that are too big to be allowed to fail. But the reality is that we could nationalize them if we needed to do so. (And for the record, I favor nationalization and swift privatization. We cannot afford a repeat of Japan's zombie banks.)
  
  The problem is that in Europe there are many banks that are simply too big to save. The size of the banks in terms of the GDP of the country in which they are domiciled is all out of proportion. For my American readers, it would be as if the bank bailout package were in excess of $14 trillion (give or take a few trillion). In essence, there are small countries which have very large banks (relatively speaking) that have gone outside their own borders to make loans and have done so at levels of leverage which are far in excess of the most leveraged US banks. The ability of the "host" countries to nationalize their banks is simply not there. They are going to have to have help from larger countries. But as we will see below, that help is problematical.
  
  Western European banks have been very aggressive in lending to emerging market countries worldwide. Almost 75% of an estimated $4.9 trillion of loans outstanding are to countries that are in deep recessions. Plus, according to the IMF, they are 50% more leveraged than US banks.
  
  Today the euro rallied back to $1.26 based upon statements from German authorities that were interpreted as a potential willingness to help out non-German (in particular, Austrian) banks.
  
  However, this more sobering note from Strategic Energy was sent to me by a reader. It nicely sums up my concerns:
  
  "It is East Europe that is blowing up right now. Erik Berglof, EBRD's chief economist, told me the region may need €400bn in help to cover loans and prop up the credit system. Europe's governments are making matters worse. Some are pressuring their banks to pull back, undercutting subsidiaries in East Europe. Athens has ordered Greek banks to pull out of the Balkans.
  
  "The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, which has already bailed out Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus, Iceland, and Pakistan -- and Turkey next -- and is fast exhausting its own $200bn (€155bn) reserve. We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights. Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country -- facing a 12% contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices -- is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn. Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5% in the fourth quarter. Protesters have smashed the treasury and stormed parliament.
  
  "'This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s,' said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank. 'There are accidents waiting to happen across the region, but the EU institutions don't have any framework for dealing with this. The day they decide not to save one of these one countries will be the trigger for a massive crisis with contagion spreading into the EU.' Europe is already in deeper trouble than the ECB or EU leaders ever expected. Germany contracted at an annual rate of 8.4% in the fourth quarter. If Deutsche Bank is correct, the economy will have shrunk by nearly 9% before the end of this year. This is the sort of level that stokes popular revolt.
  
  "The implications are obvious. Berlin is not going to rescue Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal as the collapse of their credit bubbles leads to rising defaults, or rescue Italy by accepting plans for EU "union bonds" should the debt markets take fright at the rocketing trajectory of Italy's public debt (hitting 112pc of GDP next year, just revised up from 101pc -- big change), or rescue Austria from its Habsburg adventurism. So we watch and wait as the lethal brush fires move closer. If one spark jumps across the eurozone line, we will have global systemic crisis within days. Are the firemen ready?"

Do subscribe to read rest of John's newsletter here: While Rome Burns

Second Mortgage Crisis In US: Alt-A

Highlighted the following back in Sept 2008: John Mauldin on US Housing: Are We Near The Bottom Yet?

• Alt-A is the New Subprime
  
  By now, everyone in the world is aware of how bad the subprime mortgage business was. But now it is time to get ready to hear the same tale, told again, about Alt-A mortgages. These are mortgages made to borrowers with better credit scores than subprime borrowers, but who could not or decided not to document their income. One estimate is that 70% of Alt-A borrowers may have exaggerated their incomes (Wholesale Access). More than half of those were people who exaggerated their incomes by 50% or more! (Mortgage Asset Research Institute)
  
  How much are we talking about? Around 3 million US borrowers have Alt-A mortgages totaling $1 trillion, compared with $855 billion of subprime loans outstanding. $400 billion of that was sold in 2006. Almost 16% of securitized Alt-A loans issued since January 2006 are at least 60 days late. Many of these loans (around $270 billion) were interest-only or with a low teaser rate, and the resets were at 3- and 5-year lengths. These are called Option ARMs. That means starting next year we are going to see a wave of mortgages resetting to new rates. And it is no modest increase. Rates can jump 4-8% or more from teaser rates. Some Option ARMs are resetting at 12.25%. That can double a payment.
  
  Wachovia and Washington Mutual were big sellers of Alt-A loans, and had $122 billion and $53 billion, respectively, on their books at the end of the second quarter. Is it any wonder their stocks are under pressure? That is why it is so hard to quantify how many more write-offs there will be. You don't write down a mortgage until it starts to develop problems. These problems may not show up for a few years. I continue to stress I do not want to own a financial stock that has exposure to mortgage paper. Write-downs are going to continue to come for a long time.
  
  This means there will be a steady wave of foreclosures for the next two years in communities all over the US. As long as these homes keep coming onto the market, they are going to exert downward pressure on prices. Foreclosure sales are up by 109 from this time last year.

That was John Mauldin's warning then on Alt-A mortgages!

And things have seriously deteriorated!

On today's HousingWire.com Fitch: Alt-A Mortgages Deteriorating More Rapidly than Expected

• Fitch: Alt-A Mortgages Deteriorating More Rapidly than Expected
  By PAUL JACKSON
  December 15, 2008
  
  Citing “a rapid deterioration of U.S. Alt-A RMBS performance,” Fitch Ratings again took the hatchet to its previous assumptions for Alt-A mortgages on Monday morning, revising its surveillance methodology and updating loss projections for all U.S. Alt-A RMBS.
  
  Fitch said it now expects losses on all Alt-A collateral to far exceed the estimates of its ‘moderate stress’ scenario in its late ratings update earlier this year. “Market developments, ongoing home-price declines and loan performance trends in the Alt-A sector over the prior six months have effectively eliminated the possibility of this stress scenario,” said Fitch in a statement.
  
  The rating agency said it now expects average cumulative losses om 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage Alt-A transactions to hit 2.72, 6.78 and 9.58 percent, respectively, up dramatically from expectations at the agency earlier this year.
  
  Fitch cited a “rapid increase in 60+ day delinquencies experienced over the past six months,” despite servicers’ collective efforts to hold off on actual foreclosure sales — likely implying that a halt to foreclosures is having little effect in resolving borrower delinquencies. Between May and October 2008, Fitch said that 60+ day delinquencies for the 2007 vintage increased from 8.80 percent to 14.65 percent; 2006 and 2005 vintages also experienced steep increases rising from 10.30 percent to 14.24 percent and 6.57 percent to 8.79 percent, respectively.
  
  While delinquencies are continuing to pile up, cumulative losses are not — at least, not yet.. “The small increase in cumulative losses relative to the rising level of 60+ day delinquencies reflects, in part, the lengthening foreclosure/liquidation timeline being experienced throughout all vintages,” analysts at the agency wrote.
  
  All of which means that it’s time to get ready for a whole new slew of downgrades to Alt-A in the coming few weeks. Fitch warned in its note Monday that it expects that it will downgrade many senior bonds to below investment grade — just in time for fourth quarter earnings.

On WWJ.com: A Second Mortgage Disaster On The Horizon?, Whitney Tilson explains the dangers in Alt-A and ARM.

1. One of the best guides to the danger ahead is Whitney Tilson. He's an investment fund manager who has made such a name for himself recently that investors, who manage about $10 billion, gathered to hear him last week. Tilson saw, a year ago, that sub-prime mortgages were just the start.
   
   "We had the greatest asset bubble in history and now that bubble is bursting. The single biggest piece of the bubble is the U.S. mortgage market and we're probably about halfway through the unwinding and bursting of the bubble," Tilson explains. "It may seem like all the carnage out there, we must be almost finished. But there's still a lot of pain to come in terms of write-downs and losses that have yet to be recognized."
   
   In 2007, Tilson teamed up with Amherst Securities, an investment firm that specializes in mortgages. Amherst had done some financial detective work, analyzing the millions of mortgages that were bundled into those mortgage-backed securities that Wall Street was peddling. It found that the sub-primes, loans to the least credit-worthy borrowers, were defaulting. But Amherst also ran the numbers on what were supposed to be higher quality mortgages.
   
   "It was data we'd never seen before and that's what made us realize, 'Holy cow, things are gonna be much worse than anyone anticipates,'" Tilson says.
   
   The trouble now is that the insanity didn't end with sub-primes. There were two other kinds of exotic mortgages that became popular, called "Alt-A" and "option ARM." The option ARMs, in particular, lured borrowers in with low initial interest rates - so-called teaser rates - sometimes as low as one percent. But after two, three or five years those rates "reset." They went up. And so did the monthly payment. A mortgage of $800 dollars a month could easily jump to $1,500.
   
   Now the Alt-A and option ARM loans made back in the heyday are starting to reset, causing the mortgage payments to go up and homeowners to default.
   
   "The defaults right now are incredibly high. At unprecedented levels. And there’s no evidence that the default rate is tapering off. Those defaults almost inevitably are leading to foreclosures, and homes being auctioned, and home prices continuing to fall," Tilson explains. ( do read rest of article here )

Do also check out John Mauldin's Outside the Box featured article by Gary Shilling: Semi-Annual U.S. Economic Outlook: Collapsing On Schedule

Problems With Letters Of Credit???!!!!

Here is one massive, massive, massive issue pointed out by John Mauldin in his weekly newsletter. Where Do We Go From Here?

• Letters of Credit: Going, Going Gone?
  
  Just as the business world is dependent upon commercial paper as its life blood, the world of global trade depends on letters of credit (LOC). Without LOCs, the world of trade quickly freezes up.
  
  If you are a manufacturer of a product and want to sell to someone outside your borders, you typically require a letter of credit from the buyer before you load any cargo at a port. A letter of credit from a prime bank is considered to be proof of your ability to pay. It not only can be a source of ultimate payment, it can be a source of inventory financing while goods are in transit.
  
  And if you are a business which is buying a product, you do not want to release money until you know the product is on the way. There are buyer's and seller's agents who make sure these things happen seamlessly, and world commerce had grown because of it.
  
  Now we are starting to get anecdotal evidence that this extremely vital market is also freezing up. If you think the problems stemming from a meltdown with the commercial paper markets are threatening to the world economy, they are small potatoes when compared to a seizure in the letter of credit markets.
  
  I had been thinking about this for a few weeks. Then an article posted on Naked Capitalist caught my eye. Quoting:
  
  "At the end of the day, if every counterparty is bad then you don't have a market and you don't have an economy. I spoke to another friend of mine this afternoon, whose father has been in the shipping business forever. Pristine credit rating, rock solid balance sheet. He says if he takes his BNP Paribas letter of credit to Citi today for short term funding for his vessels, they won't give it to him. That means he can't ship goods, which means that within the next 2 weeks, physical shortages of commodities begin to show up. THE CENTRAL BANKS CAN'T LET THAT HAPPEN OR WE HAVE NO ECONOMY, LET ALONE A CREDIT SYSTEM."
  
  And they quote the following story from The Financial Post of Canada:
  
  "The credit crisis is spilling over into the grain industry as international buyers find themselves unable to come up with payment, forcing sellers to shoulder often substantial losses.
  
  "Before cargoes can be loaded at port, buyers typically must produce proof they are good for the money. But more deals are falling through as sellers decide they don't trust the financial institution named in the buyer's letter of credit, analysts said.
  
  "'There are all kinds of stuff stacked up on docks right now that can't be shipped because people can't get letters of credit,' said Bill Gary, president of Commodity Information Systems in Oklahoma City. 'The problem is not demand, and it's not supply because we have plenty of supply. It's finding anyone who can come up with the credit to buy.'
  
  "So far the problem is mostly being felt in U.S. and South American ports, but observers say it is only a matter of time before it hits Canada. 'We've got a nightmare in front of us and a lot of people are concerned it's going to get a lot worse,' said Anthony Temple, a grain marketing expert based in Vancouver.
  
  "Access to credit is key to the survival of maritime trade and insiders now say the supply is being severely restricted. More than 90% of the world's trade by volume goes by ship. 'The credit crisis has made banks nervous and the last thing on their minds is making fresh loans,' Omar Nokta, an analyst at investment bank Dahlman Rose, said in an interview with Reuters.
  
  "While shipping has always been a cyclical industry whose fortunes rise and fall with the global economy, analysts said the current crisis over the drying up of credit is something they have never seen before."
  
  If banks are refusing to go into the LIBOR market and lend to each other, then why would they want to take a letter of credit either? At first, it will be a small trickle, which is how the commercial paper meltdown started. Then it will be a flood.
  
  The one good sector in the US is its export sector. Start slowing that down due to a lack of ability to ship or receive payments and see what happens to an already shrinking economy. If anyone wants to see how the credit crisis can affect Main Street, look no further.
  
  It is hard to overstate the problem and the potential for it to create a true economic meltdown. It must be dealt with, and soon. See more below.

Source: http://frontlinethoughts.com/article.asp?id=mwo101008

Subscription is required and highly recommended!

John Mauldin Writes On Betting On Financial Armageddon!

In this week's newsletter, John Mauldin writes the following Betting on Financial Armageddon

This is one issue, you should read and if you are not a subscriber to his weekly newsletter do subscribe to his newsletter via his link here

The following passage on what needs to be done is taken from this week's newsletter Betting on Financial Armageddon

• It simply takes your breathe away. As President Bush said today, it does not help to find who is at fault today, we have to figure out how to get out of this mess. It is going to cost the taxpayers a lot of money. While I think the losses on AIG will be rather minor in the grand scheme of things, if you add up Fannie and Freddie and a new RTC, coupled with the stimulus package, you can easily get to $500 billion, and that is probably a low number.
  
  For such a price, we had better get a new regulatory scheme which requires reduced leverage. Want to get really mad? Up until 2003, all investment banks were allowed only 12 to 1 leverage. Then in 2004, the SEC basically gave five banks (and only five banks) the ability to lever up 30 or even 40 to 1. Bet you can guess the five banks. Bear, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan and Goldman. Three down.
  
  As Barry Ritholtz wrote: "So while the SEC runs around reinstating short selling rules, and clueless pension fund managers mindlessly point to the wrong issue, we learn that it was the SEC who was in large part responsible for the reckless leverage that led to the current crisis." (Don't get me started on blaming the short sellers. Let's not blame the people who leveraged up their companies 40 to 1 with bad investments.)
  
  We absolutely must move credit default swaps to a regulated exchange, no matter how much investment banks and hedge funds scream. Must be done. Do it now. Real rules about writing mortgages, although now that losses are in the hundreds of billions, underwriting rules are already becoming quite restrictive.
  
  And while we are at it, a thorough revamping of the rating agencies and the rules they use should be at the top of someone's list.
  

John Mauldin on US Housing: Are We Near The Bottom Yet?

In this week's newsletter, John writes the following Housing: Are We at the Bottom?

• Housing: Are We at the Bottom?
  
  The short answer is no, but let's look at the data from one of the most knowledgeable sources on that topic. John Burns of John Burns Real Estate Consulting consults with over 2000 of the largest banks and homebuilders in the country (his client list is a who's who of banks, builders, and hedge funds). He has a reputation for solid research and pulling no punches. Some of his hedge fund clients were the ones you read about who made billions. (He wishes he had negotiated a percentage!) He is deeply involved in analyzing trends in the housing market. His web site is http://www.realestateconsulting.com/. He has graciously sent me the executive summary of his latest posting (a 27-page executive summary) that we will be looking at for the next few pages.
  
  Let's start with a quote from John at the beginning of his report: "The prospects for the U.S. housing market have changed for the worse. It has become increasingly clear that the U.S. economy is on the brink of recession, as overall job growth has slowed to zero and retailers are reporting abysmal results. New home sales, traffic and pricing are all heading down according to the results of our survey of over 300 builder executives. Resale [existing home] sales are starting to plateau in some markets, but pricing continues to fall as distressed sales dominate the market. The new housing bill will help in some ways, but will first serve a devastating blow to homebuilders, with the elimination of seller-funded down payment assistance, which accounts for 17% of new home demand by one estimate."
  
  How far along are we? Burns thinks that home prices will drop by 22%, 12% of which has already occurred. His analysis differs from that of the Case-Shiller Indices, which suggests a much steeper decline. Note in the graph below that the Case-Shiller Index shows home prices rising more than does Burns' work. Part of it is different methodology and part of it is that the CS index focuses on major markets and Burns' work is more broadly based.

Not forgetting the Alt-A!!!

• Alt-A is the New Subprime
  
  By now, everyone in the world is aware of how bad the subprime mortgage business was. But now it is time to get ready to hear the same tale, told again, about Alt-A mortgages. These are mortgages made to borrowers with better credit scores than subprime borrowers, but who could not or decided not to document their income. One estimate is that 70% of Alt-A borrowers may have exaggerated their incomes (Wholesale Access). More than half of those were people who exaggerated their incomes by 50% or more! (Mortgage Asset Research Institute)
  
  How much are we talking about? Around 3 million US borrowers have Alt-A mortgages totaling $1 trillion, compared with $855 billion of subprime loans outstanding. $400 billion of that was sold in 2006. Almost 16% of securitized Alt-A loans issued since January 2006 are at least 60 days late. Many of these loans (around $270 billion) were interest-only or with a low teaser rate, and the resets were at 3- and 5-year lengths. These are called Option ARMs. That means starting next year we are going to see a wave of mortgages resetting to new rates. And it is no modest increase. Rates can jump 4-8% or more from teaser rates. Some Option ARMs are resetting at 12.25%. That can double a payment.
  
  Wachovia and Washington Mutual were big sellers of Alt-A loans, and had $122 billion and $53 billion, respectively, on their books at the end of the second quarter. Is it any wonder their stocks are under pressure? That is why it is so hard to quantify how many more write-offs there will be. You don't write down a mortgage until it starts to develop problems. These problems may not show up for a few years. I continue to stress I do not want to own a financial stock that has exposure to mortgage paper. Write-downs are going to continue to come for a long time.
  
  This means there will be a steady wave of foreclosures for the next two years in communities all over the US. As long as these homes keep coming onto the market, they are going to exert downward pressure on prices. Foreclosure sales are up by 109 from this time last year.

Read the rest of his write-up here

Here's a tip, do subscribe to his newsletter! http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/subscribe.asp

John Mauldin Warns That US Banking System Is In Trouble

In his newsletter, John Mauldin has made strong warning on the US Banking is in trouble.

• The US Banking System Is in Trouble
  
  A few weeks ago when I was in Maine, I met Chris Whalen. Chris is the managing director of a service called Institutional Risk Analytics, whose primary business is analyzing the health of banks and financial institutions. If you are one of their clients, you can go to their web site and drill quite deep into all aspects of every bank in America. And what they have done is come up with various metrics which compare how well-capitalized a bank is, how much risk it is taking, and what kind of losses (or profits) it can expect. It is a one of a kind firm, and the data gives Chris a very special perspective on the US banking system.
  
  And what he sees is not pretty. There is a crisis brewing. He expects 100 banks to fail between now and July of 2009. Most of them will be small, but there will be a few large banks. The total assets of those banks he estimates to be $850 billion (not a typo!). Those are the assets the FDIC is going to have to cover when they take over the banks.
  
  Take Washington Mutual as an example. There are problems there. Their debt now trades at 20%, which is worse than junk. There is no way they could issue preferred stock to recapitalize their business. And they are going to need more capital, as they have writedowns in their future due to the slowing of the economy. Any common issue would have to seriously dilute existing shareholders almost to the point of nothing. There are circumstances in which they can survive, but it would take a remarkable recovery for the US economy, which is not likely. Maybe management can pull a rabbit out of the hat, but it will need some strong magic to get the capital they need at a cost they can live with.
  
  The FDIC has about $50 billion. These reserves have been built up over the years from deposit insurance paid by banks that are part of the program. They are going to need an estimated $20 billion just to cover the failure of Indy Mac. The FDIC will have to cover only a small percentage of the $850 billion, as some of those assets will surely be good. But if they have to cover 10%, then the FDIC would need another $50 billion. Does that sound like a lot? Chris thinks a more conservative number for planning purposes would be 20-25% potential losses, and you hope it does not get there.
  
  Sometime in the next few quarters, Congress and the President, either the current group or early in the term of the next President, are going to have to address that potential shortfall, before we see bank runs as people fear that FDIC insurance reserves may not be enough. The very sad fact is that taxpayers are going to be on the hook for some time. What is likely to happen is that a loan facility will be made to the FDIC so they can borrow as much as they need, and pay it back from future bank insurance payments.
  
  You can't make up the shortfall just by raising fees. Chris points out that raising fees right now is not really a winning option, as that just makes the financial books of marginal banks even worse. You can raise rates as the banking system returns to health.
  
  If Congress and the President wait too long, there could be a very serious problem, as depositors could start moving their funds under $100,000 (the insured amount) to what they perceive may be a safer bank than their current bank. Rumors could run rampant. This is something that needs to be addressed now. Frankly, this should be addressed right after the elections AT THE LATEST, in consultation with Congress and the new President.

View complete article here: It's more than Fannie and Freddie (Subscription is required and recommended!)

John Mauldin's Comments On US Housing

Was reading John Mauldin's newsletter, The Rise of A New Asset Class. (Fully recommend you to subscribe to his newsletter: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/subscribe.asp )

The following passage caught my attention.

• First, we had an investor-driven transaction bubble in housing. There were 48% more houses built since 2005 than should have been built, if you were simply looking at trends.
  
  What that means is there are 3.5 million homes we have to work through. Now, that means that the 8 or 9 hundred thousand homes that we're now down to building a year, is going to end up going down to 400,000. It's going to take some time to work through those excess homes - for the prices to drop enough that people can go in and buy them or rent them. We are probably talking 2011 before we finally work through this housing crisis and get back to a normal market where housing contributes significantly to GDP growth.
  
  Sales activity is probably going to correct another 30 percent. That's not fun. By the middle to the end of this year, sales are going to be really low. As a side issue, those of you who like to invest in real estate and actually want to own a home to rent are going to have some good opportunities.

And yes, John firmly believes that the US is in a recession!

• We're in a recession. Recessions by definition mean that we're going to be seeing rising unemployment. We're already up past 5.5 percent. We'll probably see 6 percent and maybe higher. We're not going to see the 9 and 10 percents like we did in the '70s or '80s, because we're not as subject to the manufacturing cycle as we were back then. That's both good and bad. We don't have that boom-bust in the manufacturing world. We're seeing a bust in the construction world and we're starting to see commercial lending and commercial building go down. But I don't think we're going to see the large 8 and 9 percent unemployment rates that we typically see in a recession. But still, if you see rising unemployment - and unemployment rises by 20 percent, from 5 to 6 - that means those people are going to have less money and they're not going to be spending it.

Do read the rest of it here.

Reading Stuff for the Weekend

One of the most interesting article I have read this Saturday was John Mauldin's What Does the Fed Know?. I strongly suggest a read.

And while we are on this issue, then the piece posted on Wall Street Journal is worth a read too, Criticism of Rate Cut Mounts.

That link was posted by Kirk on his link fest. And since I am on Kirk, I suggest giving the following link a read too: Why are bloggers so bearish?

And last but not least, do read Kirk's stock market lessons series: Part I, Part II, Part III and Part IV. ( See also Kirk's Stock Market Lessons of 2006: Part I, Part II, & Part III ). They are all highly recommended!

The Panic of 2007

The following article The Panic of 2007 was penned by Mr. John Mauldin, Frontlinethoughts.com,

• You cannot explain the problems with just one or two items. A perfect storm of this sort takes a number of factors all coming together to work its mischief. Bad mortgage underwriting practices, bad rating agency practices, a destruction of confidence, excessive leverage and then the withdrawal of that leverage, the need for yield, greed, and complacency which then in a Minsky moment (explained below) becomes paralyzing fear - all play their part....

Do give the rest of this highly interesting article a read: http://frontlinethoughts.com/article.asp?id=mwo081707