Thursday, November 13, 2008

Market Is Still In A Limbo As Libor For Dollars Climb!

On Bloomberg news..

  • Libor for Dollars Climbs; Three-Month Rate Snaps 23-Day Decline

    By Anchalee Worrachate

    Nov. 13 (Bloomberg) -- The cost of borrowing dollars for three months in London rose, snapping a 23-day decline, signaling policy makers have yet to succeed in thawing the global credit freeze.

    The London interbank offered rate, or Libor, that banks say they charge each other for such loans increased almost 2 basis points to 2.15 percent today, according to British Bankers' Association data. The last time the rate climbed was Oct. 10. The overnight rate also rose 2 basis points, to 0.40 percent, or 60 basis points below the Federal Reserve's target rate.

    Declines in money-market rates may be petering out amid signs the financial crisis will persist and is spreading to the global economy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said yesterday he plans to use the second half of the $700 billion financial-rescue program to help relieve pressures on consumer credit, scrapping an effort to buy devalued mortgage assets.

    ``The market is still in a limbo, and Paulson's statement yesterday doesn't help,'' said Robin Marshall, head of international fixed income in London at NCL Smith & Williamson, which oversees about $20 billion in assets. ``It's true U.S. policy makers have done a lot to address important issues, but given the magnitude of the problem, the $700 billion package is looking too small rather than too big.''

read rest of the news article here: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aK7aQmjuKGKs&refer=worldwide

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Looking Back At Berkshire's 2007 Shareholder Letters

Was reading Warren Buffett's shareholders letters again, Given the current malaise in the markets, I thought it be good to highlight the following passages again, given what has happened now. ( See page 18 , http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf )

  • The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.

    This means that the remaining 72% of assets – which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments –
    must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%. And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.

    How realistic is this expectation? Let’s revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497. This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually. An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years. It was a wonderful century.

    Think now about this century.
    For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow – recently below 13,000 – would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099. We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.

    It’s amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000. If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years. While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?

    Dividends continue to run about 2%. Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets – allowing for expenses of .5% – would produce no more than 7% or so. And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and highpriced managers (“helpers”).

    Naturally, everyone expects to be above average. And those helpers – bless their hearts – will certainly encourage their clients in this belief. But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average. The reason is simple: 1) Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur; 2) Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low; 3) With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group – the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group – the “know-nothings” – must win.

    I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century – envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation – are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about double digit returns from equities, explain this math to him – not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.

    Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans. This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well? I’ve never seen this puzzle explained. But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.

    What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.

    After decades of pushing the envelope – or worse – in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up. It should listen to my partner, Charlie: “If you’ve hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing.”

Tuesday, November 11, 2008

Sino Hua An Q3 Earnings.

Blogged previously:

1.
Regarding Sino Hua-An
2.
More On Sino Hua-Ann
3.
Who wants Sino Hua-An?
4.
Still Who Wants Huann?

The key issue said was..

And let's look at the company's net profit margins.

1) 07 Q4 Revenue 233.375 million. Net Profit 37.442 million. Margin = 16%.
2) 08 Q1 Revenue 290.798 million. Net Profit 35.567 million. Margin = 12.2%.
3) 08 Q2 Revenue 434.426 million. Net Profit 36.916 million. Margin = 8.5%.

How would you interpret such earnings?

Look at the revenue, its sky rocketing but the company has NOT been able to turn the extra, extra revenue into more cash and instead the net margins are deteriorating. From 16% to just 8.5%.

How? How would you evaluate such earnings? Good? Average? or Poor?


Sino Hua Ann reported its earnings tonight.


The following was its performance.

08 Q43 Revenue 496.993 million. Net Profit 11.711 million. Margin = 2.3%!!!!!!!!!!


Now surely this is a concern, yes?

You have earnings declining at a drastic pace and the margins right now is razor thin!

Balance sheet, check out the trade receivables! Did you see how it rose from 72.308 million (a quarter ago) to an incredible 203.3 million???

And the cash is depleting too!

How?

Morgan Stanley: 2009 Should Not Be 1998 Deja vu!!!

Here's an extremely interesting article posted on the Edge stating why Morgan Stanley Research reckons that 2009 won't be the same as 2008!

Note where Malaysia stands!!!!

  • 11-11-2008: 2009 should not be 1998 deja vu
    By Morgan Stanley Research

    Investment case
    The Asia-Pacific ex-Japan equity index has declined as much as 65% from the October 2007 peak, a larger decline than in the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, or in the TMT bust of 2000-2001.

    Valuation is well below the trough levels of the Asian crisis, Asia’s deepest modern downturn. To assess the prospects for Asian markets in the current global downturn, we compare Asia’s current fundamentals to those in the Asian crisis, the most relevant benchmark given Asian markets were undeveloped in the Great Depression or the 1970s. We conclude that Asia is far better placed than it was in 1997 to withstand a financial crisis, and that China is best placed within Asia.

    APxJ equity valuation is a record low, far below Asian crisis trough levels
    APxJ is at a record low on 11 of our 12 valuation metrics. The forward P/E, trailing P/E, and dividend yield are 17%, 37%, and 41%, respectively, below the average of the prior four market troughs. Whilst P/BV is well above the Asian crisis low, ROE is still substantially higher.

    Even if we exclude Australia and New Zealand, both of which largely avoided the Asian crisis, the valuation is still more attractive than at the trough in September 1998. Indeed, forward and trailing P/Es are 8% and 49% below the trough levels, respectively, whilst dividend yield is 12% more attractive.

    Again, while Asia ex-Japan’s P/BV is still 39% higher than at the Asian crisis trough, only 11 months in the past 29 years have seen a lower valuation.

    Furthermore, the current AxJ ROE is well above the level at the crisis trough, at 14.9% versus 4.3%.

    Differences between today and 1997-1998
    1) The rise of China and India
    A key difference between Asia today and in 1997-1998 is the emergence of China as a key driver of growth. Since 1996, China’s share of regional GDP has grown from 25% to 44% (2008), while India’s share has increased from 11% to 13%. By contrast, the rest of the region has fallen from 64% to 43%, led by Korea and Taiwan, falling 10 percentage points (ppt) to 14%, and Asean, falling 7ppt to 14%. With China never more important, its ability to engineer a soft landing is critical to Asia’s growth outlook.

    2) Strong external sectors: Trade balance; FX reserves
    Unlike 1997, Asia’s external sector is in substantial surplus, reflective of a more diversified direction of trade (the US is at a record low 14.6% of Asia’s exports), more diversified export base, competitive exchange rates, high national saving rates, strong investment in export industries and, until recently, strong global growth.

    Asia’s export performance has been robust, up 20.6% year-on-year (y-o-y) in 3Q08, led by Korea, China, India, and the commodity producers of Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia. Singapore and Taiwan have lagged.

    Current account balances have improved significantly from -US$28.2 billion (-RM100.11 billion) in 1996 to US$525 billion in 2007 (7.4% of GDP) and are expected to stay at a large 5.6%-5.9% of GDP in 2008-2009. Foreign exchange reserves have risen from about US$500 billion in 1997 to more than US$3.3 trillion. The external balance is strongest in China, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, and weakest in Australia, India, and Korea.

    In the current global financial crisis, Asian central banks have begun to utilise their FX reserves to defend their currencies and support their banking systems. Korea, for example, has intervened in its FX market and injected US$30 billion of liquidity into its banking system from its foreign reserves. Backed by FX reserves, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Taiwan have guaranteed their bank deposits. Hong Kong has also indicated its intention to use its FX reserves to stabilise financial markets should the need arise.

    3) Ample scope for policy response
    In the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, IMF austerity programmes were imposed on Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Korea, requiring a substantial tightening of monetary and fiscal policy. In this cycle, however, IMF rescue plans are being implemented in Eastern Europe’s Hungary, Ukraine and Iceland.

    By contrast, Asia is currently aggressively easing policy, a trend we expect to continue given Asia’s strong fundamentals. First, high headline inflation, a reflection of the commodity boom, should continue to decline sharply. Indeed, key commodities are now well below 4Q07 levels, including oil (-25% y-o-y), the MGMI base metals index (-38% y-o-y), wheat (-34% y-o-y), palm oil(-32% y-o-y), soybean (-17% y-o-y), ethylene (-55% y-o-y), and naphtha (-61% y-o-y), while corn (-2% y-o-y) and steel (China HRC +3% y-o-y) are about flat. Only rice (50% y-o-y) remains well above year-ago levels.

    As such, we expect headline inflation to fall below core inflation, which in core Asia (Asia ex-India, Indonesia and the Philippines) is just 2.0% y-o-y, below the 1H97 average of 4.1%.

    Together with Asia’s large external surpluses, low levels of leverage, and liquid and well-capitalised banking systems, low inflation should support significant policy easing to counter the global downturn. This is already happening across Asia, led by North Asia, India and Australia. With rates in the US at 1%, Asia should ease policy by another 100-200bp — our economists expect China (108bp), Korea (125bp), Australia (225bp), Taiwan (50bp), Malaysia (75bp) and Thailand (75bp) to all ease rates over the next year.

    4) A commodity tax cut
    Asia is now the major consumer of most global commodities, and even consumes almost as much oil as the US. With the oil price falling from an average of almost US$125/bbl in 2Q-3Q08, a US$55/bbl tax cut to US$70/bbl is equivalent to a US$385 billion tax cut for Asian consumers, or equal to 4.8% of GDP. Whilst this estimate assumes the pass-through of lower oil prices in countries with price controls like China and India, competitive pressures and the global downturn should ensure this happens in the near future. Currency weakness in Australia, Korea, and India will moderate the oil tax cut benefit. Furthermore, given Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia are large energy producers, and Australia is very energy efficient, we would expect them to receive a smaller benefit. Whilst commodity prices also fell in the Asian crisis, the decline was far less significant. Furthermore, in that instance, Asia was the source of the demand weakness, whilst today the weakness is emanating from the US and other developed economies.

    5) Modest household leverage
    Household sector leverage in most of Asia is dramatically lower than in the US or UK. Only Australia, with a household debt/GDP ratio of 110%, is higher. On the other hand, China at 13% and India at 14% are dramatically lower. Similarly, consumption’s share of GDP is also far lower, and has significant room to expand.

    6) Record banking system liquidity
    Asia’s banking system has never been more liquid, with the bank loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) at a record low 72%, far below the mid-1990s peak of 113%. Only Australia (143%) and Korea (140%) have LDRs well above 100%. The lowest LDRs are in Hong Kong (60%) and China (65%).

    7) Strong corporate sector; low gearing, moderate capex, strong free cash flow
    Asia’s corporate sector has substantially restructured over the past decade. First, balance sheet leverage has improved substantially, with leverage at a record low 32%, about half the levels of a decade ago (65% in 1996 and 74.3% in 1997). The improvement has been broad-based across Asia.

    Second, capital spending in the listed sector is generally under far better control, with the capex/depreciation ratio for the region at a moderate 179%, close to the long-term average, and far below the 260% of 1996-1997. Within Asia, capex discipline appears to have been strongest in Hong Kong (capex-depreciation ratio of 158% versus a long-run average of 264%), but worst in India (ratio of 333% versus a long-run average of 228%) and Australia (240% versus 173%).

    Third, free cash flow is strong at 6% of sales versus a negative 3.3% a decade ago. Free cash flow is positive across all markets, but particularly in Hong Kong and Indonesia. Altogether, returns are now far above the cost of capital at 15.2%, up from just 10.1% pre-crisis, and comparable to developed market peers.

    Country ranking —Greater China best
    Putting these criteria together, we have ranked the region by country, concluding that Greater China — China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong —
    is best placed, whilst Australia, Malaysia and India are worst placed.

    If Asia’s so good,why has it been so bad?
    The obvious response to this analysis is that it has been a lousy indicator of market performance over the past year. We attribute Asia’s poor performance to three key factors: rapid financial institution deleveraging, depressed risk appetite and a deteriorating earnings outlook. On financial institution deleveraging, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) have been heavy sellers in Asia since the credit crunch began. Indeed, net selling in six Asian emerging markets totalled US$93.2 billion, or 69.2% of the preceding inflows of the 2003-2007 bull market. Consistent with this, foreign ownership has fallen to at least a seven-year low of 29.4% in Korea, a five-year low of 18.6% in India, and a three-year low of 27% in Taiwan.

    Furthermore, anecdotally, the gross and net investment weighting of hedge funds in Asia has never been lower.

    That said, margin lending is still high in Australia at 2.5% of market cap, or 3.1% of GDP, well above the 10-year averages of 1.6% and 1.7%, respectively. Inflows into mutual funds in India [inflow of Rs300 billion (RM22.55 billion) year to date] and Korea [fund balance up 26.5 trillion won (RM73.18 billion) year to date] have remained positive. Margin lending in Taiwan, however, is at a record low 1.1% of market cap (versus an average 2.3%).

    Second, global risk appetite appears to be very significant in Asia, and the collapse in the MS Global Risk Demand Index has coincided with weakness in Asia equities. Third, reflecting past cycles, the market has been anticipating the economic downturn and earnings downgrades. Indeed, the index has declined far ahead of analyst earnings revisions. With consensus earnings still at 13.8% for 2009, we too see material downside toward our base-case forecast of -1% and bear-case forecast of -21% y-o-y.

    Morgan Stanley economists foresee a material slowdown in Asian GDP growth, but do not see a recurrence of 1997-1998. That said, Chetan Ahya is emphasising downside risks, pointing to the risks to exports from an EM downturn, the impact on cost of capital from capital outflow and FX weakness, and the hit from financial market instability. Against this, the support from monetary and fiscal easing and lower commodity prices will need to be balanced.

Source: http://www.theedgedaily.com/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_8a454971-cb73c03a-1c8b24d0-4c01ae8c

Federal Reserve Is Refusing To Disclose Where $2 Trillion Went!!

Utterly shocking!!

Published on Bloomberg.
Fed Defies Transparency Aim in Refusal to Disclose

  • By Mark Pittman, Bob Ivry and Alison Fitzgerald

    Nov. 10 (Bloomberg) --
    The Federal Reserve is refusing to identify the recipients of almost $2 trillion of emergency loans from American taxpayers or the troubled assets the central bank is accepting as collateral.

    Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said in September they would comply with congressional demands for transparency in a $700 billion bailout of the banking system. Two months later, as the Fed lends far more than that in separate rescue programs that didn't require approval by Congress,
    Americans have no idea where their money is going or what securities the banks are pledging in return.

    ``The collateral is not being adequately disclosed, and that's a big problem,'' said Dan Fuss, vice chairman of Boston- based Loomis Sayles & Co., where he co-manages $17 billion in bonds. ``In a liquid market, this wouldn't matter, but we're not. The market is very nervous and very thin.''

    Bloomberg News has requested details of the Fed lending under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and filed a federal lawsuit Nov. 7 seeking to force disclosure.

    The Fed made the loans under terms of 11 programs, eight of them created in the past 15 months, in the midst of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression.

    ``It's your money; it's not the Fed's money,'' said billionaire Ted Forstmann, senior partner of Forstmann Little & Co. in New York. ``Of course there should be transparency.''


    Treasury, Fed, Obama

    Federal Reserve spokeswoman Michelle Smith declined to comment on the loans or the Bloomberg lawsuit. Treasury spokeswoman Michele Davis didn't respond to a phone call and an e-mail seeking comment.

    President-elect Barack Obama's economic adviser, Jason Furman, also didn't respond to an e-mail and a phone call seeking comment from Obama. In a Sept. 22 campaign speech, Obama promised to ``make our government open and transparent so that anyone can ensure that our business is the people's business.''

    The Fed's lending is significant because the central bank has stepped into a rescue role that was also the purpose of the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, bailout plan -- without safeguards put into the TARP legislation by Congress.

    Total Fed lending topped $2 trillion for the first time last week and has risen by 140 percent, or $1.172 trillion, in the seven weeks since Fed governors relaxed the collateral standards on Sept. 14. The difference includes a $788 billion increase in loans to banks through the Fed and $474 billion in other lending, mostly through the central bank's purchase of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds.

    Sept. 14 Decision

    Before Sept. 14, the Fed accepted mostly top-rated government and asset-backed securities as collateral. After that date, the central bank widened standards to accept other kinds of securities, some with lower ratings. The Fed collects interest on all its loans.

    The plan to purchase distressed securities through TARP called for buying at the ``lowest price that the secretary (of the Treasury) determines to be consistent with the purposes of this Act,'' according to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the law that covers TARP.

    The legislation didn't require any specific method for the purchases beyond saying mechanisms such as auctions or reverse auctions should be used ``when appropriate.'' In a reverse auction, bidders offer to sell securities at successively lower prices, helping to ensure that the Fed would pay less. The measure also included a five-member oversight board that includes Paulson and Bernanke.

    At a Sept. 23 Senate Banking Committee hearing in Washington, Paulson called for transparency in the purchase of distressed assets under the TARP program.

    `We Need Transparency'

    ``We need oversight,'' Paulson told lawmakers. ``We need protection. We need transparency. I want it. We all want it.''

    At a joint House-Senate hearing the next day, Bernanke also stressed the importance of openness in the program. ``Transparency is a big issue,'' he said.

    The Fed lent cash and government bonds to banks, which gave the Fed collateral in the form of equities and debt, including subprime and structured securities such as collateralized debt obligations, according to the Fed Web site. The borrowers have included the now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co.

    Banks oppose any release of information because it might signal weakness and spur short-selling or a run by depositors, said Scott Talbott, senior vice president of government affairs for the Financial Services Roundtable, a Washington trade group.

    Frank Backs Fed

    ``You have to balance the need for transparency with protecting the public interest,'' Talbott said. ``Taxpayers have a right to know where their tax dollars are going, but one piece of information standing alone could undermine public confidence in the system.''

    The nation's biggest banks, Citigroup, Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley, declined to comment on whether they have borrowed money from the Fed. They received $120 billion in capital from the TARP, which was signed into law Oct. 3.

    In an interview Nov. 6, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said the Fed's disclosure is sufficient and that the risk the central bank is taking on is appropriate in the current economic climate. Frank said he has discussed the program with Timothy F. Geithner, president and chief executive officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a possible candidate to succeed Paulson as Treasury secretary.

    ``I talk to Geithner and he was pretty sure that they're OK,'' said Frank, a Massachusetts Democrat. ``If the risk is that the Fed takes a little bit of a haircut, well that's regrettable.'' Such losses would be acceptable, he said, if the program helps revive the economy.

    `Unclog the Market'

    Frank said the Fed shouldn't reveal the assets it holds or how it values them because of ``delicacy with respect to pricing.'' He said such disclosure would ``give people clues to what your pricing is and what they might be able to sell us and what your estimates are.'' He wouldn't say why he thought that information would be problematic.

    Revealing how the Fed values collateral could help thaw frozen credit markets, said Ron D'Vari, chief executive officer of NewOak Capital LLC in New York and the former head of structured finance at BlackRock Inc.

    ``I'd love to hear the methodology, how the Fed priced the assets,'' D'Vari said. ``That would unclog the market very quickly.''

    TARP's $700 billion so far is being used to buy preferred shares in banks to shore up their capital. The program was originally intended to hold banks' troubled assets while markets were frozen.

    AIG Lending

    The Bloomberg lawsuit argues that the collateral lists ``are central to understanding and assessing the government's response to the most cataclysmic financial crisis in America since the Great Depression.''

    The Fed has lent at least $81 billion to American International Group Inc., the world's largest insurer, so that it can pay obligations to banks. AIG today said it received an expanded government rescue package valued at more than $150 billion.

    The central bank is also responsible for losses on a $26.8 billion portfolio guaranteed after Bear Stearns Cos. was bought by JPMorgan.

    ``As a taxpayer, it is absolutely important that we know how they're lending money and who they're lending it to,'' said Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Arlington, Virginia- based Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

    Ratings Cuts

    Ultimately, the Fed will have to remove some securities held as collateral from some programs because the central bank's rules call for instruments rated below investment grade to be taken back by the borrower and marked down in value. Losses on those assets could then be written off, partly through the capital recently injected into those banks by the Treasury.

    Moody's Investors Service alone has cut its ratings on 926 mortgage-backed securities worth $42 billion to junk from investment grade since Sept. 14, making them ineligible for collateral on some Fed loans.

    The Fed's collateral ``absolutely should be made public,'' said Mark Cuban, an activist investor, the owner of the Dallas Mavericks professional basketball team and the creator of the Web site BailoutSleuth.com, which focuses on the secrecy shrouding the Fed's moves.

    The Bloomberg lawsuit is Bloomberg LP v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 08-CV-9595, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

Deutsche Bank Declares General Motors To Be Worthless!!

Blogged the other day: General Motors Says No More Money!!!

And now the folks at Deutsche Bank has downgraded GM to worthless! Yes, worthless and not worth less!

  • LONDON (MarketWatch) -- Deutsche Bank downgraded General Motors Corp. (GM: General Motors Corporation News, chart, profile, more 3.36, -1.00, -22.9%) to sell from hold, with a price target of $0, saying the car maker may not be able to fund its U.S. operations beyond December without government intervention. Deutsche Bank said it believes the U.S. government will be compelled to intervene through a capital infusion or loan. "Without government assistance, we believe that GM's collapse would be inevitable, and that it would precipitate systemic risk that would be difficult to overcome for automakers, suppliers, retailers, and sectors of the U.S. economy," the broker said. Even if GM avoids bankruptcy, equity shareholders are unlikely to get anything back, it added. (source: here )

On CNBC: GM's Shares Plunge Amid Worsening Outlook, most other analysts also don't see much HOPE left for GM!

  • Barclays' analyst Brian Johnson downgraded GM to "underweight'' from "equal weight.'' Deutsche Bank also cut GM to "sell'' from "hold,'' and saw an equity value of $0 for the stock, according to a report on theflyonthewall.com.

    Reuters could not immediately verify the report.

    "While further government assistance would decrease the likelihood of a GM bankruptcy, we believe any government assistance would likely significantly dilute GM's equity,''
    Barclays' Johnson wrote in a note to clients.

    Johnson cut his price target on the stock to $1 from $4.

    "Of the four broad options for government assistance for GM, we believe that political pressure to protect taxpayers may lead to a solution similar to the 1979 Chrysler bailout, which was accompanied by concessions from debt holders, labor, suppliers and management,'' Johnson said.

    In any scenario, we see little value for current equity,'' he added.

    Separately, an analyst at J.P.Morgan Securities said both GM and Ford Motor are likely to receive government aid, even as he widened his loss estimates for both companies after they reported far deeper-than-expected quarterly losses.

    "Ford management's commentary on the third-quarter call as well as GM's comments raises our optimism that some form of government help is likely given dire Big 3 liquidity,'' JP Morgan's Himanshu Patel wrote in a note to clients.

On CNN: GM: Bailout push can't halt stock slide

On WallStraitsJournal. America's Two Auto Industries

  • Can you imagine life without General Motors Corp.? That's now an urgent question facing America's political leaders.

    GM survived for 100 years, steering through two world wars, the Great Depression, and all the booms and busts in between. But on Friday, GM said it faces a substantial risk of financial collapse by the middle of next year unless the economy makes a significant improvement, the capital market freeze thaws, or the government provides the money to sustain the company through the downturn.

    The Democratic Congress and President-elect Barack Obama signaled last week they are willing to lend a hand. "The auto industry is the backbone of American manufacturing and a critical part of our attempt to reduce our dependence on foreign oil," Mr. Obama said Friday.

    So the question isn't whether Washington is willing to offer more public money to help auto companies survive. There even appears to be a consensus on how much: Up to $50 billion. The tougher question is what's Washington's goal?

    First, Congress and Mr. Obama will need to decide what they mean by "the auto industry."

    America has two auto industries. The one represented by GM, Ford and Chrysler is Midwestern, unionized, burdened with massive obligations to retirees, and shackled to marketing and product strategies that have roots reaching back to the early 1900s.

    The other American auto industry is largely Southern and non-union, owes relatively little to the few retirees it has, and enjoys a variety of advantages because its Japanese, European and Korean owners launched operations in this country relatively recently. Their factories are newer, their brand images and marketing strategies are more coherent -- Toyota uses three brands in the U.S. to GM's eight -- and they have cars designed for the competitive global market that exists today.

    Honda Motor Co. sells one basic Civic world-wide. Ford sells two different versions of its rival Focus compact car. Ford is engineering one Focus to take advantage of global economies of scale, but the new car won't hit the U.S. market until 2010.

    The New American auto industry employs about 113,000 people, according to a recent study by the Center for Automotive Research. The economic slump is hammering sales and profits for these manufacturers, too. But they aren't looking for subsidies, and probably wouldn't get any since the rules governing the auto industry aid proposals to date effectively exclude them.

    So this debate is strictly about the Old American auto industry, represented by the "Big Three" of Detroit. The Detroit Three employ more than 200,000 people directly, and sustain nearly 3 million more indirectly, according to the CAR study. Diminished as they are, the Detroit Three still account for about 4% of U.S. gross domestic product. They also represent a way of doing business that has run its course. GM's plea for a federal bailout makes that official.

    The government could justify subsidies as a way to prevent more job losses at the Detroit auto makers. But that would risk delaying the restructuring the unionized auto makers need to be viable. In the fragmented U.S. auto market of the 21st Century, auto makers will need to be nimble enough to make money on 10-15% market share or less – not the 29% that GM was aiming for less than a decade ago. Does the government want to get into the business of subsidizing job cuts – paying for retraining and relocation for those who lose their jobs?

    Washington could decide the goal in providing taxpayer-financed subsidies to the Detroit auto makers is to increase the number of fuel efficient and high technology cars on the market. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi hinted at this last week in discussions with Detroit Three executives in Washington.

    The success of government-mandated automotive product strategies is mixed. The laughable Trabant was a product of the East German Communist government's ideas about affordable personal transportation. On the other end of the spectrum, government mandates such as the California Air Resources Board's demands for "zero emission" vehicles have spurred auto makers to take risks on new technology they otherwise might have left on the shelf. Modern gas-electric hybrids such as the Toyota Prius exist in part because of bureaucrats.

    One thing Washington could do to spur profitable sales of fuel-stingy cars is put a floor under gas prices, which now have dipped below $2 a gallon in some parts of the country. No one's discussing such an idea.

    Perhaps the government will decide that its role should be to give the Detroit Three the chance to play the same game as its international rivals when it comes to the costs of health care.

    Auto makers with home operations in Europe and Japan start with a big advantage in that they are not directly shouldering on their income or balance sheets the burden of providing health care to the bulk of their retirees. Those costs are largely borne by the government and the costs spread to taxpayers.

    The Detroit Three in 2007 set up a mechanism to unload their union retiree health obligations by 2010 to trusts controlled by the United Auto Workers. But those trusts aren't up and running yet, and aren't fully funded. Government subsidies could be used to plug that funding gap, and allow the Detroit Three to put their cash into better cars. This is a proposal the UAW supports.

    There's another thing the government could do with $50 billion. It could give a $4,000 to $5,000 tax rebate to everyone who buys a new car or truck made in the United States during the next year. The tax break could be scaled up for people who trade in a low mileage vehicle for a vehicle that burns 15%-20% less gas – a percentage that's roughly equivalent to the share of oil the U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf.

    Leaving it up to consumers what auto companies should benefit from government subsidies might not save GM. But it would save the government from having to choose sides between America's two auto industries.

And GM last traded at 3.36!

Monday, November 10, 2008

Another Russian Crisis?

Another crisis looming?

Published on Bloomberg.

  • Ruble Devaluation Looms on Oil; Troika Sees 30% Drop

    By Emma O'Brien and Ye Xie

    Nov. 10 (Bloomberg) -- Russia's currency reserves, the third-biggest in the world, are no match for tumbling oil prices and an exodus of capital that may force the central bank to accept a devalued ruble.

    Just 10 years ago, Russia let the ruble fall as much as 71 percent as the government defaulted on $40 billion of debt and world stock and bond markets collapsed. Now, the combination of a 61 percent drop in oil prices from their peak in July, slowing economic growth and increasing investor concern about emerging markets are draining Russia's foreign reserves, which fell 19 percent to $484.6 billion in the 12 weeks through Oct. 31.

    Russia, which uses reserves to curb swings in the ruble that hurt the competitiveness of exports, may find the resistance futile after the currency fell 13 percent against the dollar since Aug. 1. The central bank sold a record $40 billion in October, according to Moscow-based Trust Investment Bank. Troika Dialog, the country's oldest investment bank, said the currency may slump as much as 30 percent in the event of a devaluation.

    ``When oil falls, capital runs out of Russia and the ruble weakens, it's not justified to hold your positions,'' said Anas El Maizi, who oversees $342 billion in fixed-income assets in Paris at Axa Investment Managers, a unit of Europe's second- largest insurer. ``If oil stabilizes at this level, Russia will have some trouble.'' Axa cut its Russian bond holdings in August.

    Long-Term Capital

    Bank Rossii, the central bank, may ``gradually'' widen its ruble trading band if the current account falls into a deficit next year, Arkady Dvorkovich, an economic adviser to President Dmitry Medvedev, said Nov. 7. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. said the comment marked a ``departure from the previous party line.''

    The ruble rose 0.2 percent to 26.9690 per dollar as of 11:08 a.m. in Moscow, from 27.0304 on Nov. 7. Against the euro, it dropped 0.5 percent to 34.5459, from 34.3773.

    When Russia defaulted in August 1998, it caused an investor stampede to the safest assets. Yields on 10-year U.S. Treasury notes dropped more than half a percentage point to 4.98 percent that month and the Standard & Poor's 500 Index slumped 15 percent. Hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management LP collapsed after losing about $4 billion, prompting a Federal Reserve- backed bailout by Wall Street. Gross domestic product in Russia shrank 6.5 percent and inflation accelerated to 84 percent.

    100 Billionaires

    Since then, rising prices of oil, gas and metals such as nickel and aluminum provided Russia with 10 years of economic growth under former President Vladimir Putin and his hand-picked successor, Medvedev. Foreign reserves grew to $598.1 billion in August, the world's biggest behind Japan's and China's, from $18.4 billion just before the 1998 default.

    With average economic growth of about 7 percent a year since 1999, rising commodity and stock prices created more than 100 Russian billionaires, including aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska and soccer club owner Roman Abramovich. In December last year, Time magazine named Putin ``Person of the Year'' for bringing his country ``roaring back to the table of world power.''

    Russia's current account, the widest measure of flows in goods and services, is now headed toward a deficit. Investors pulled at least $140 billion out of the country in the past three months, according to BNP Paribas SA, sending the dollar- denominated RTS Index of stocks down 61 percent.

    The benchmark 30-year government bond slumped in 2008, pushing the yield to an almost seven-year high of 12.55 percent on Oct. 27. So far this year, the RTS Index lost 67 percent, headed for the worst performance since 1998.

    Growth Slows

    ``With the oil price falling we were concerned that the trajectory of Russia's reserves had changed from building them up to selling them,'' said Kieran Curtis, a fund manager in London at Aviva Investors Ltd., which cut Russian holdings in August from the $787 million of emerging-market assets it has under management.

    Russia is poised to grow 7.7 percent this year, the Economy Ministry said Oct. 29, down from 8.1 percent in 2007. Gross domestic product will expand 5.4 percent in 2009, according to a Bloomberg survey of 14 economists.

    The combined wealth of Forbes magazine's 25 richest Russians fell more than 50 percent in four months, based on the equity value of stocks and analysts' estimates.

    Bank Rossii, headed by Chairman Sergey Ignatiev, began managing the ruble's exchange rate in February 2005 against a currency basket comprised of about 55 percent dollars and 45 percent euros. Policy makers let it trade within a fixed range in mid-May. Since then, it has dropped 2.2 percent against the basket to 30.39. Though the central bank doesn't reveal the limits of the band, BNP Paribas considers 30.40 to be its weaker end.

    No `Sharp Devaluation'

    ``You can't stimulate a slowing economy by keeping the currency fixed,'' said Lars Christensen, head of emerging- markets currency strategy in Copenhagen at Danske Bank A/S. ``They will have to change their attitude to using reserves for the sake of the economy.''

    Dvorkovich increased speculation that Russia will reduce its interference in foreign exchange last week when he told reporters in Moscow a ``prolonged'' period of deficit in the current account may prompt policy makers to ``gradually'' widen the trading band.

    The current account, now at a surplus of $91.2 billion, may swing into a deficit as early as next year, though there will be no ``sharp devaluation'' in the ruble in 2008 or in 2009, Dvorkovich said.

    Tumbling Crude

    ``These remarks mark a departure from the previous party line among top officials that there was no reason for the ruble to depreciate,'' Rory MacFarquhar, a senior economist at Goldman Sachs in New York, wrote in a note Nov. 7. ``They confirm our view that there is a strong political preference for gradual depreciation over a steep devaluation, even though the central bank would prefer the latter approach.''

    Urals crude, Russia's export oil blend, rose to an all-time high of $142.94 a barrel in July. For the past three weeks, it has averaged $61.74, below the $70 mean price that Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said in September the government will need to balance its budget next year. It traded at $57.08 today.

    ``Without an increase in oil prices or an improvement in the capital account of the balance of payments, the central bank will eventually have to devalue,'' Evgeny Gavrilenkov, Troika Dialog's Moscow-based chief economist, wrote Nov. 7. An average price for Urals crude of $60 a barrel ``would imply a devaluation of the ruble against the bi-currency basket by 25 to 30 percent,'' he said.

    BRICs Cooperate

    Russia's reserves are 25 times bigger today than what it had on the eve of the default, central bank data show. The world's biggest energy exporter, Russia still earns $700 million a day from oil, compared with $100 million 10 years ago, according to Chris Weafer, chief strategist in Moscow at UralSib Financial Corp., Russia's biggest privately owned bank.

    ``The market is getting overly bearish,'' said Michael Ganske, head of emerging-markets research in London at Commerzbank AG. ``This is a temporary phenomenon and the ruble will stay stable until investors realize the value.''

    Brazil, Russia, India and China, the so-called BRIC nations, plan coordinated measures to increase trade and capital flows between their economies, Kudrin said in a Nov. 8 interview in Sao Paulo. Russia, the world's second-biggest oil producer, will also pursue an ``independent'' strategy on production, ignoring the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' moves to cut output, he said.

    Gazprom, Norilsk

    While Russia's plight 10 years ago reflected an economy emerging from communist control, the turmoil today is part of a crisis hurting nations worldwide as a shortage of credit prompts investors to sell higher-yielding assets in favor of the safest securities.

    OAO Gazprom, Russia's natural-gas exporter, said Oct. 22 it may have trouble getting new loans and refinancing debts even after posting record earnings. OAO GMK Norilsk Nickel, the world's largest producer of the metal, posted a 33 percent decline in first-half earnings on Oct. 3 as demand slumped.

    Russians are taking note. Svetlana Malyarevich, a Moscow- based accountant, says she considered changing some of her savings into foreign currency after people in her office said the ruble might slide to 40 per dollar.

    ``People who have ruble accounts understand that their savings decline if the dollar rises,'' the 36-year-old said. ``The security of my money is directly dependent on the economic situation in Russia.''

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avXSlS6mv4Hs

Top Hedge Fund Managers Says It Isn't Over

Posted on CBS's MarketWatch: Hedge fund managers 'funereal' in midst of crisis

  • SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- In the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, several top hedge fund managers sent a grim message to their investors in October: it isn't over.

    One said he was sickened by the crisis, while another admitted shock and embarrassment at the severity of the market slump and the losses his firm suffered.

    A third warned clients to be careful about buying anything and said it will be years before investors should buy stocks.

    Such pessimism is often taken as a sign that markets may have hit a bottom and most of the managers realized this. Indeed, some said they'd already begun buying securities that they think are cheap enough to discount all the gloom.

    The Standard & Poor's 500 index slumped more than 16% in October, while credit markets collapsed.

    Spreads on investment-grade corporate debt jumped by 151 basis points, while junk bond spreads surged by 521 basis points to a record 1,617, according to CreditSights.
    Losses in these markets so far this year reached 19% and 31% respectively, prompting the fixed-income research firm to ask "Can it get any worse?"

    Hedge funds have been hit particularly hard by this market collapse. The average manager lost 5.43% in October, leaving them down more than 15% so far this year, according to preliminary estimates on Friday from Hedge Fund Research.

    That puts the $1.7 trillion industry on course for its worst year since at least 1990, when HFR began tracking performance. Before 2008, hedge funds had only one down year in that time: in 2002 they lost 1.45% on average.

    'Funereal'

    Steve Galbraith, a partner at Lee Ainslie's Maverick Capital, read about 25 letters other hedge funds sent to their investors in October.

    "The tone of the discourse was funereal," he wrote in Maverick's own Oct. 9 letter to clients. "The global economy has already entered a grim recessionary period akin to those of the '90s and '80s rather than the shallow post tech bubble recession of 2001-2002."

    The Maverick Fund, Ltd. was down more than 7% last month through Oct. 17, leaving it off roughly 26% so far this year, according to a hedge fund performance report compiled by HSBC's private bank.

    In Maverick's Oct. 9 letter to investors, the firm reported that its funds lost between 14.4% and 40.6% during the third quarter.

    "I cannot find words to describe our disappointment, embarrassment and shock over the above results," Ainslie wrote.

    Oct. 1 marked the 15th anniversary of Maverick Capital, during which time Ainslie has outperformed the S&P 500 handily.

    But Maverick couldn't shelter from what Ainslie called a "perfect storm" of hedge fund de-leveraging and failure, short selling bans, slumping equity markets, faltering prime brokers and a spike in volatility.

    Buffett bashing

    "Be careful buying ANYTHING today," Kyle Bass, managing partner of Hayman Advisors, warned in an Oct. 17 letter to investors.

    "There will be a time to buy stocks," he added. "That time is a few years into the future when the strong have separated themselves from the week ... a time when unemployment has hit 10% and U.S. GDP has dropped 4-5% (maybe more)."

    He criticized Berkshire Hathaway's Chairman Warren Buffett who advised investors to buy U.S. stocks in a New York Times column last month.

    "Mr. Buffett has enough money to be able to have his holdings drop 50% and still fly in his jets and live the way in which he has become accustomed," Bass wrote. "Do you have enough capital to take what you have left, cut it in half, and continue to live the way you have for the past few years? I don't."

    'Carnage'

    Seth Klarman, a top-performing value investor and head of The Baupost Group LLC, told clients in an Oct. 10 letter that the economic downturn could be "vicious and protracted."

    "The financial market collapse and bailout makes us sick," he wrote. "There is likely more carnage to come."

    The U.S. dollar will likely weaken and its reign as the world's reserve currency could end, Klarman predicted. Longer-term, U.S. interest rates may rise as foreigners have to be enticed more to invest in dollar-denominated assets, he added.

    The recent Treasury Department bailout has yet to be paid for and should add to inflationary pressures over time, especially when the economy begins to recover, he said.

    Baupost has built a "sizable position" in low-cost inflation protection for the next three to five years, he noted.

    'Genuinely depressed'

    Howard Marks, chairman of Oaktree, a giant LA-based fixed-income hedge fund firm, said some "great" investors he knows were "genuinely depressed" when the credit crisis reached a peak in October.

    Pessimism fed on itself as managers exchanged increasingly gloomy emails about the coming meltdown, he explained in an Oct. 16 letter to investors.

    "People's only concern was bullet-proofing their portfolios to get through the coming collapse, or raising enough cash to meet redemptions," Marks wrote. "The one thing they weren't doing last week was making aggressive bids for securities. So prices fell and fell -- the old expression is 'gapped down' -- several points at a time."

    Like Klarman, Marks worried about the impact of government bailouts and interest rate cuts on future prices, recalling the hyper-inflation in Weimar Germany in the 1920's.

    It may be time to re-think holding long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, which currently yield little because investors have bought them as havens from riskier assets, Marks said. (Inflation eats into the future fixed payments of bonds, undermining their value).

    Interconnected

    Thomas Barrack, founder of distressed debt and real estate investment firm Colony Capital, said the crisis has exposed how complicated the financial system has become -- and how difficult it will be to get it working properly again.

    "I have absolutely no idea how the intricacies of the global financial system function. I had previously taken solace in believing that 'the other guys' did understand," said Barrack, a former Reagan administration official. "What we all now realize is that nobody understands and nobody ever understood."

    "The current turmoil is larger, more complicated, more volatile, more interconnected and more global than anyone had anticipated," he added in an Oct. 14 letter to investors.

    Barrack has experience with troubled banks during previous financial crises, having worked with TPG's David Bonderman and Cerberus Capital Management's Stephen Feinberg restructuring Korea First Bank and Aozora Bank respectively.

    He was gloomy about the Treasury's efforts to buy toxic assets from troubled U.S. banks, arguing $750 billion won't be enough. The amount needed to acquire these assets, even at true market value, could be in the trillions, he said.

    Bank stocks probably haven't bottomed yet and the stock market "will no doubt have further and dramatic dips," he predicted.

    Rubble

    Still, almost all these managers said the carnage will create great investing opportunities. The key is surviving to take advantage.
    Perry Capital LLC, run by former Goldman Sachs trader Richard Perry, has been buying first-lien bank debt that yields more than 15%. It's also bought a portfolio of securities backed by near-prime and so-called Alt-A mortgages.

    "We will continue to pick through the carnage," Perry said in an Oct. 8 letter to investors.

    Baupost's Klarman has been buying corporate debt offering yields of as much as 30%. The firm is also seeing some opportunities to invest in real estate, through the debt of distressed companies, he added.

    "The seeds of recovery and eventually of substantial profit are sown amidst the carnage," he wrote. "The world is not ending."

    Oaktree's Marks expects boutique investment banks including Evercore to benefit as larger banks become more regulated, bureaucratic and risk-averse.

    "In the third stage of a bear market ... everyone agrees things can only get worse," Marks wrote on Oct. 16. "There's no doubt in my mind that the bear market reached the third stage last week."

    "That doesn't mean it can't decline further, or that a bull market's about to start," he added. "But certainly it's a good time to pick among the rubble."
    Maverick's Ainslie said on Oct. 9 that he'd never seen as many extremely over-valued and under-valued stocks at the same time. That presents great opportunities for hedge funds that both short equities and go long.

    "The most important objective at this point is simply to endure this unique turbulence to be positions to take advantage of the far more productive environment that will exist on the other side of this nightmare," he wrote