Bill Gross Says Bull Market Is Imminent

Posted on CNBC.

• A bull run will begin for the stock market once major financial institutions have deleveraged, Bill Gross, head of bond titan Pimco, said on CNBC.
  
  While warning of the implications of shedding bad debt, Gross said the market may be nearing a point where it comes out of a severe bear market and makes a run higher.
  
  "Bull run, yes, but to what extent in terms of the total return, I don't think it would be typical of prior cycles, because this is a secular delevering," he said. "It's never occurred before—at least it hasn't occurred since the 1930s—and it will carry with it implications for corporate profits, for margins and for ultimately a significantly delevered system not just in the United States but globally."
  
  "To the extent that that happens, not only is the financial marketplace not prepared for it but the global economy is not prepared for it," he added. "We will have to see how it all adjusts going forward. But yes, from a certain price point here and we may be close, a bull market is imminent."

Source: http://www.cnbc.com/id/27363513

Having A Flexible Investing Mindset

Great advice posted by Brian Pretti on his editorial posted on FinancialSense market wrap: Changing the Frequency

• I could go on and on with the examples of this concept, but you get the point. Remaining flexible here is key. Remember, I said flexible, not cocky. And not contrary just to be contrary. We have some bad economic numbers to come. Consumers are hurting with very little relief in sight. The financial sector remains a mess, and in a number of specific cases, perhaps a few black holes. As I said, real marginal change may be years away for all I know. Personally, I don’t see any yet. But, that doesn’t mean I’m not starting to look. In fact this is exactly what I’m doing. At worst, I’m wasting my time. Quite the inexpensive exercise in monetary terms. But I don’t consider it a waste at all. In my mind, real change at the margin is almost always unseen by the crowd. But importantly, it is seen and discounted by the markets. I just need to remind myself in periods such as this that remaining absolutely rigid and unbending in any one direction is a poor investment stance. Humility and flexibility - don’t forget.

KNM Comments About BTimes Article

Posted on Business Times: SC probes KNM's abnormal intra-day trading

• SC probes KNM's abnormal intra-day trading
  By Francis Fernandez Published: 2008/10/24
  
  Dealers say the intra-day trading pattern of KNM shares in recent weeks mirrors that of Iris at its peak a few years ago, with massive swings to the downside followed by upward buying momentum
  
  THE Securities Commission (SC) has initiated a probe into the abnormal intra-day trading activities of KNM Group Bhd shares.
  
  "We are examining the announcements made by the company (KNM) on Bursa Malaysia. If there are any indications of wrongdoing or breaches of securities laws, then appropriate regulatory action will be taken," an SC spokesperson told Business Times.
  
  The company was queried on October 15, following a sharp decrease in price and high volume of its shares. In its reply then, KNM said it was unaware of the cause for the unusual market activity.
  
  On Bursa Malaysia yesterday, KNM was the second most active stock, with 45.79 million shares traded. It closed RM0.035 lower at RM0.595. Its intra-day high and low were RM0.605 and RM0.580 respectively.
  
  KNM, which controls three per cent of the world's process equipment market, was the hottest oil and gas stock last year, helped by a growth story and backed by a string of overseas acquisitions.
  
  That strategy helped KNM, which has an order book of RM4.7 billion, to grow its profit over the past five years to RM188.3 million for the year ended December 31 2007 from RM25.57 million in 2003, as well as raise more than a billion ringgit this year from script issues.
  
  Nonetheless, long term shareholders such as the Employees Provident Fund and Fidelity International Ltd have been net sellers in recent weeks.
  
  Dealers say the intra-day trading pattern of KNM shares in recent weeks mirrors the trading pattern of Iris Corp Bhd shares at its peak a few years ago, with massive swings to the downside, followed by upward buying momentum.
  
  From September 2005 to May 2006, Iris rose from an eight sen a share stock to RM1.36 per share, with an average 200 million shares being traded daily.
  
  The Iris gravy train eventually left investors teary-eyed after market regulators designated the stock, and filed civil suits against Datuk Tan Mong Sing, Low Thiam Hock and Aeneas Capital Management, a US hedge fund, for market manipulation.
  
  KNM, like Iris, has 10 sen shares, with huge paid up capital base of 3.95 billion and 1.36 billion respectively. However, unlike Iris, big ticker houses such as UBS and JP Morgan are bullish on KNM. Bloomberg records show all major research firms are recommending investors to buy KNM, with a price target of above RM1.

Today KNM posted a reply on Bursa Malaysia:

(click on the image for a much larger view)

Actually I am lost!

Perhaps its my eyes but there seems to be a disconnect between what BTimes published and KNM's reply, for I see no where did BTimes mentioned anything about PE multiples!

Perhaps KNM management was referring to this article: 15-10-2008: Major shareholders exit KNM

1. Announcements to Bursa Malaysia indicate that the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) disposed of about eight million shares in the company on Oct 8, trimming its shareholding to 272.8 million shares or 6.9% of the share capital.
   
   EPF had come into KNM with a 5.3% shareholding in mid-June last year and had been trading the company’s shares heavily but had never disposed of such a big block.
   
   An analyst from a local broking house said that the major sell-down could also be due to KNM’s foreign shareholders dumping their shares in the open market. “They are getting out of emerging markets and pulling back funds to their original country in a bid to support their own economy,” he told The Edge Financial Daily.
   
   The analyst was referring to Boston-based FMR LLC and Bermuda-incorporated FIL Ltd (Fidelity).

(It would have been nice that the writer named who the analyst is! Yes quote the source!)

Or perhaps KNM was referring to this article: 16-10-2008: KNM comes under selling pressure

Or perhaps KNM was referring to this article: Is the sharp drop in KNM's share price justified?

I really do not know! I am simply so confused!

Anyway what was interesting for me was the following:

What was interesting for me personally was this announcement posted by KNM, Changes in Sub. S-hldr's Int. (29B) - Inter Merger Sdn Bhd

This is a company in which Mr.Lee has interest in and if you see Changes in Director's Interest (S135) - Lee Swee Eng

The following was most interesting:

• Acquired 23/10/2008 11,376,000
  Disposed 16/10/2008 72,271,600

Disposal was massive!

And did you see the point 2? Disposal of 72,271,600 shares - sold down by financier which is now resolved

And more interestingly, the company DID a share buyback during this same period! Notice of Shares Buy Back by a Company pursuant to Form 28A

Look at the details.

Date of buy back from : 16/10/2008
Date of buy back to : 22/10/2008
Total number of shares purchased (units) : 22,190,200
Minimum price paid for each share purchased (RM) : 0.415
Maximum price paid for each share purchased (RM) : 0.690
Total amount paid for shares purchased (RM) : 13,544,216.13

Reading Artice: Take Heart: Why the Malaysian Bear Market is Common

Here is an article for weekend reading: Take Heart: Why the Malaysian Bear Market is Common

Cheers!

Credit Crunch Jokes!

• A trader: "This is worse than a divorce. I've lost half my net worth and I still have a wife."
  
  President Bush said clients shouldn't be concerned by all these bank closings. If the bank is closed, you just use the ATM, he said.
  
  George Bush said that he is saddened to hear about the demise of Lehman brothers. His thoughts at this time is to go out to their mother as losing one son is hard, but losing two is a tragedy.
  
  The problem with investment bank balance sheets is that on the left side nothing is right and on the right side nothing is left.
  
  In maths there are 30 billion prime numbers below 700 billion. The rest are all subprime.
  
  How do you define optimism? A banker who irons 5 shirts on a Sunday.
  
  What do you call 12 investment bankers at the bottom of the ocean? A good start.
  
  Why are all MBAs going back to school? To ask for their money back.
  
  For Geography students: What's the capital of Iceland ? Answer: About Three Pounds Fifty...
  
  If you want to gamble, go to Las Vegas . If you want to trade in derivatives, God bless you.
  
  Whats the difference between a guy who just lost everything in Vegas and an investment banker? A tie.
  
  Whats the difference between a bond and a bond trader? A bond matures.
  
  Lehman have changed their recommendation on Lehman from hold to sell.
  
  Forty years ago I sold fifty shares of my company stock and had enough money to purchase a brand-new 1967 Ford pickup. Last week, I checked it out, and if I sold another fifty shares, Id have enough money to buy a 1967 Ford pickup. So, the market has stabilized.
  
  What have an Icelandic bank and an Icelandic streaker got in common ? They both have frozen assets.
  
  A Director decided to award a prize of £50 for the best idea of saving the company money during the credit crunch. It was won by a young executive who suggested reducing the prize money to £10.

ps: Chelski play LFC this weekend, m8! How? Comeon United!

Jeremy Grantham Joins The Bullish Camp!

Yes, Jeremy Grantham of GMO has joined the Bullish Camp!

Yes, another of the legendary investors has joined the bullish camp. ( Can you count how many already?)

However, before anyone jumps the gun, perhaps it's best we understand what Jeremy is saying here!

Several interesting issues he has written. Firstly I agree very much with his current assessment on what has happened. Here are his ten points.

• The time to blame should be past, or at least in abeyance until the crisis is past, but I find it impossible to avoid it completely. Sorry. In any case, just to set the scene, it is necessary to review briefly the poisonous wind that we all sowed.
  
  1. We had an extended period of excess increase in money supply, loan growth, leverage, and below normal interest rates.
  
  2. This combined with a remarkably lucky global economic environment that we described as “near perfect” to produce a bubble in asset classes, as such a combination has done without exception according to our research. Since all these factors were global, the combination produced what we have called “the first truly global bubble” in all assets everywhere with only a few modest exceptions.
  
  3. While these asset bubbles were inflating, facilitated by easy money, the authorities – the Fed, the SEC, the Treasury, and Congress – rather than tightening existing regulations, partially dismantled them. They freed commercial banks while further reducing controls on investment banks, allowing leverage to take wing. More recently they almost gratuitously, without being pressured, removed the uptick rule for shorting. And this is just a sample. Simultaneously, attempts in some quarters to address growing risks were beaten back or diluted by Democrats and Republicans alike. Examples here include early efforts to rein in stock options and the attempt to add controls to Fannie and Freddie. (I’m biting my lip not to name names.) Worse yet, the regulating authorities appeared to encourage the worst excesses by admiring the ingenuity of new financial instruments (okay, that was Greenspan), and by repeating their belief that no bubbles existed (or perhaps could ever exist) and that housing at the peak “merely reflected a strong U.S. economy.” Finally, as the bubbles inevitably began to break, all was said to be contained and the economy was claimed to be strong.
  
  4. The combination of favorable conditions and irrationally exuberant encouragement from the authorities produced an even more poisonous bubble – that in risk-taking itself. Everybody, and I mean everybody, got the point that risk-taking was asymmetrical and reached to take more risk. The asymmetry here was that if things worked out badly they would help you out (this sounds very familiar!), but if all went well you were on your own, poor thing. Ah, the joys of pure capitalism!
  
  5. In this regard, some deadly groundwork had been laid by the concept of rational expectations, or market efficiency. This argued that we were all far too sensible for major bubbles to appear. This is a convenient theory for mathematical treatment, but obviously totally unconnected to the real world of greed and fear. It dangerously encourages the belief that if you take more risk you will automatically receive more reward. That condition might often, even usually, be the case because in normal quiet markets a rough approximation of that relationship is usually priced into the markets. But in wildly-behaving markets where risk is mispriced, it is not true. From June 2006 to June 2007 on our seven-year data, investors lulled by these beliefs and the conditions of the market were actually paying to take risks for the first time in history.
  
  6. Just as all bubbles have broken, these bubbles did. Far from being a surprise, the bubbles breaking were absolutely not outlier events, contrary to protestations. The bubbles forming in 1998 and 1999 and in 2003 through 2007 were the outlier events. The U.S. housing market, which was a clear bubble with prices at least 30% above a previous very stable trend, is well on its way back to normal, and equities and risk-taking may well have made it all the way back.
  
  7. The stresses on the financial and economic world of these bubbles breaking was always going to be great. To repeat a comment I made 18 months ago, “If everything goes right (as a bubble breaks) there will always be lots of pain. If anything is done wrong there will be even more. It is increasingly impressive and surprising how much we have done wrong this time!”
  
  8. By far, the biggest failing of our system has been its unwillingness to deal with important asset bubbles as they form (see last quarter’s Letter). I started a long diatribe on this topic in 1998 and 1999 and reviewed it in Feet of Clay (2002), which is aimed at my arch villain, Alan Greenspan. With the housing bubble even more dangerous to mess with than equities, Bernanke joined my rogues’ gallery. If we change our policy and move gently but early to moderate bubbles, this crisis need never be repeated. There are signs that the previously intractable authorities are reconsidering their bone-headed position on this topic. If they change, all this pain will not have been totally in vain. (See Part 2 of this Letter, titled “Silver Linings,” in two weeks or so.)
  
  9. The icing on the cake as far as the bust is concerned has been provided by Buffett’s “financial weapons of mass destruction” – the new sliced and diced packages of loan material so complicated that, shall we say, few understood them. The uncertainties and doubts generated by their complexities were impressive. Trust and confidence are the keys to our elaborate financial structure, which is ultimately faith-based. The current hugely increased doubt is a potential lethal blow to the system and must be addressed at any cost as fast as possible. Concern about moral hazard is secondary and must be put into abeyance for the time being. Wall Street leaders are in any case now fully scared and are likely to stay that way for a few years!
  
  10. To avoid the development of crises, you need a plentiful supply of foresight, imagination, and competence. A few quarters ago I likened our financial system to an elaborate suspension bridge, hopefully built with some good, old-fashioned Victorian over-engineering. Well, it wasn’t over-engineered! It was built to do just fine under favorable conditions. Now with hurricanes blowing, the Corps of Engineers, as it were, are working around the clock to prop up a suspiciously jerry-built edifice. When a crisis occurs, you need competence and courage to deal with it. The bitterest disappointment of this crisis has been how completely the build-up of the bubbles in asset prices and risk-taking was rationalized and ignored by the authorities, especially the formerly esteemed Chairman of the Fed.

And for the investor in you and me, the following two passages are of great read!

And I do think that his 'ask yourself what it is that you really know or think you really know' is absolutely spot on!

• Basics
  At times like this it is good to ask yourself what it is that you really know or think you really know. For us (in our asset allocation division) it is defi nitely not the ins and outs of the financial system, although we’re trying harder and harder. The financial system is so mind-bogglingly complex that very few, even those with far deeper backgrounds than ours, fully understand it. Puzzlingly, despite our relative ignorance of financial details, we were more accurate than many experts in the last year about the big picture, and we can speculate why. First, as historians, we recognized that when bubbles break they almost invariably cause more pain than expected.
  
  Second, we are Minsky mavens and believe that, with sadly defective humans making up the markets, Minsky was right to see periodic financial crises as well-nigh inevitable. Thus in the middle of last year when the experts at Goldman Sachs said they expected write-downs of $450 billion, I immediately wrote that we’d be lucky if it wasn’t a trillion. I was playing off their detailed expertise and adding a generalized historical observation as I had done with the prediction that “at least one major bank – broadly defined – would fail,” and that half of the hedge funds would be gone in five years. In previous banking crises, major banks had failed, and this crisis seemed likely, to us semi-pros, to be worse than most. So we studied in broad strokes previous crises and armchaired that we should up the ante. We got lucky in an area in which we were not real experts, and we know we were lucky. We will attempt to keep the luck and hedge our bets by also increasing our skills. The addition of Edward Chancellor, an experienced financial journalist/historian with a focus on credit crises, has been a very helpful start.
  
  In contrast, what we do know, I believe, is asset class pricing and the behavior of bubbles, which are both derivatives of our single, big truth: mean reversion. for moderately more real growth in recent years. In the six years since October 2002, the trend line has risen to 975 (plus or minus a little – we are constantly fine-tuning a percent here or there). Needless to say, two weeks ago the market crashed through that level, producing Exhibit 1. So now all 28 burst bubbles are present and accounted for. Long live mean reversion!

Yes, nothing absolutely last forever, especially bubbles. Ask yourself, were you too bullish on your stocks, neglecting the fact that the earnings was boosted mainly by the insane bull run in your stock operating environment? And when bubbles burst, it is perhaps best we acknowledge that earnings will contract sharply!

And lastly this passage should be acknowledged by value investors!

• The Curse of the Value Manager
  
  We at GMO have a strong value bias, and our curse, therefore, like all value managers, is being too early. In 1998 we saw horribly overpriced stocks that at 21 times earnings equaled the two previous great bubbles of 1929 and 1965. Seeing this new “peak,” we were sellers far, far too early, only to watch it go to 35 times earnings! And as it went up, so many of our clients went with it, reminding us that career risk is really the only other thing that matters. The other side of the coin is that only sleepy value managers buy brilliantly cheap stocks: industrious, wide-awake value managers buy them when they are merely very nicely cheap, and suffer badly when they become – as they sometimes do – spectacularly cheap. I said as far back as 1999, while suffering from selling too soon, that my next big mistake would be buying too soon. This probably sounded ridiculous for someone who was regarded as a perma bear, but I meant it. With 14 years of an overpriced S&P, one feels like a perma bear just as I felt like a perma bull at the end of 13 years of underpriced markets from 1973-86. But that was long ago. Well, surprisingly, here we are again. Finally! On October 10 th we can say that, with the S&P at 900, stocks are cheap in the U.S. and cheaper still overseas. We will therefore be steady buyers at these prices. Not necessarily rapid buyers, in fact probably not, but steady buyers. But we have no illusions. Timing is difficult and is apparently not usually our skill set, although we got desperately and atypically lucky moving rapidly to underweight in emerging equities three months ago. That aside, we play the numbers. And we recognize the real possibilities of severe and typical overruns. We also recognize that the current crisis comes with possibly unique dangers of a global meltdown. We recognize, in short, that we are very probably buying too soon. Caveat emptor.

Click here for his newsletter: http://www.gmo.com/websitecontent/JGLetter_3Q08.pdf

Would You Buy MaeMode?

I made a quiz the other day: Would You Buy This Stock?

And reader valuelife made the following comments..

• Based on these data, Definitely NOT a Buy 4 me!!
  
  Net debt too high, capital intensive stock??
  
  Receivables showed big jump, helped by loans??

Sometimes if we take OUT the stock name, things can be rather clear. The underlining fundamental weakness in the stock simply stood out like sore thumb.

I will paste what Kenanga Research said about this stock!

• 1QFY09 in line. Revenue and net profit of RM127.8m and RM5.2m was 23.6% and 20.8% of our forecast respectively. Better results were driven by higher contract values being executed.
  
  QoQ, 1Q09 revenue rose 7.0% while EBIT margin improved to 10.2% from 8.9%, lifted by various cost efficiency measures taken to counter the rising cost environment. As a result, pre-tax profit was also higher by 19.2% even after accounting for higher financing costs (1Q09: RM4.1m vs 4Q08: RM3.2m).
  
  YoY, 1Q09 revenue surged 26.2% on the back of higher contribution from bulk material and warehousing logistics division which accounted 41% and 29% of group’s 1Q09 revenue . Both EBIT and pre-tax margin was stable at about 10% and 7% respectively. Net profit was however fl at at RM5.2m, mainly due to one-off expenses amounted to RM4.7m incurred in restructuring of loan facilities and higher tax provision.
  
  Construction for the Suqian plant in China is on track to meet first phase opening by 1Q2009. The plant when ready by 2011 will double group’s current capacity and lift group’s profile as a global player in the material handling business.
  
  No slowdown in coal exploration activities despite easing of commodity prices. Supply of coal is expected to remain tight with robust demand underpinned by developing countries especially China and India. Recent RM41.5m contract clinched for the construction of coal handling facility at Asam-Asam port should cement group’s position as the leading supplier in Indonesia. Management is confident that group is well positioned to secure more similar contracts in future.
  
  We continue to like Maemode for its China expansion and exposure in the higher end products including warehousing logistics and bulk material systems, which will drive a net profit CAGR of 22.7% for the next 3 years. With an order book of RM360m lasting up to 2010, group is still actively bidding for more than RM1b jobs which should further boost its order book given a historical 38% strike rate. Maintain forecasts and reiterate BUY with target price of RM1.58 based on CY09 PER of 6x.

Yes the stock name is MadeMode!

Past postings on MaeMode:

1. A look at MaeMode again

2. Mae, I hope I am not WRONG!

3. Reply to Mae, I hope I am not WRONG!

4. MaeMode Again

5. The Trade Receivables In MaeMode

Here's the full table highlighting MaeMode's recent performance.



Just for the record: MaeMode is at 1.17 and MaeMode warrant is at 17 sen.

Comments Heard Admist The Plunging Baltic Dry Index

Yes, the Baltic Dry Index continued its plunge yet again.

I have collected some of the recent comments heard around...

• China is expecting a severe downturn in shipping. China Shipping Container Lines, China's second-largest container line, expects a 10% volume shrinkage this year. Bloomberg quoted Zhang Denghui, assistant president, saying that "Traffic will drop at least 10% for the full year. An even much larger drop is possible, as the full impact of the global economic turmoil is yet to come."
• Khalid Hashim, managing director of Precious Shipping, Thailand's second-largest shipping company, said in Singapore yesterday. "Nothing is moving because the trader doesn't want to take the risk of putting cargo on the boat and finding that nobody can pay."

Source: Crisis Hits World Shipping ( Oct 20 )

• He says another reason for the big fall in the index has been a number of new ships have arrived on the market just as global trade is slowing down. - David Osler of the Lloyds List shipping journal

Source: Baltic Dry Index actually drying up

• "The global economic slowdown will push some shipping lines into bankruptcy," Marc Faber, a famed investor and editor of the "Gloom Boom & Doom" report, told AFP.
• Malaysia's Port Klang said it had been hit by a decline in cargo handling since the start of October, blaming a retail downturn and lower vehicle sales in the United States and Europe.
  Shanghai International Port said that growth in cargo traffic dropped sharply to 9.9 percent in the first half of 2008 on the "increasingly grave global economy and trade situation".
  "Faced with the severe economic situation at home and abroad, the port industry has met with the most complicated operation environment in recent years," it said.
• "We are seeing a rapid decline in the volume of exports," an official with the Japanese Shipowners' Association said of the decline in demand.
• "It's a safe statement that no carrier is operating profitably in the eastbound transpacific market today," said Ron Widdows, chairman of the Transpacific Stabilization Agreement -- a forum of major shipping lines.

Source: Asian shipping slows

• “Shipping is an entrepreneurial game, and there are people losing their shirts at the moment,” executive director of the Australian Shipowners Association, Teresa Hatch, says. “But it might be the bust that we had to have. "Shipyards have been so far behind on meeting demand, people have been waiting up to four years for a ship.”
• Whole shipping lines have frozen up, according to a Business Spectator report on Tuesday, because shipowners don’t want to take the risk of carting cargo for clients that may not be able to pay because of the credit crisis.
  “Like many of the other clogged arteries of global finance, letters of credit and therefore global shipping could presumably unclog fairly quickly if the interbank credit market got moving again,” wrote the article’s author, Alan Kohler.
  “But a big fall in shipping rates, as measured by the key price indicator, the Baltic Dry Index, is always a harbinger of a downturn in trade and therefore economic activity.”

Source: Lift for exports as shipping prices plunge

• A trade adviser based in Sydney, Sri Annaswamy, wrote to me last night to correct me, explaining that it’s not that shipping is being affected by the credit crisis – it’s that banks don’t want to open or honour letters of credit “that they know would ultimately be defaulted upon due to the Chinese buyer’s refusal/inability to accept the shipment (that’s the core of the problem)”.

Source: What's really happening in China

• “Traders who hire ships on spot basis are facing difficulties to secure letters of credit from banks,” said an executive at Chowgule Steamships Ltd, who did not want to be named. Letters of credit assure a shipper of payment for a cargo after it is loaded on a ship, but before the buyer receives it.
  The squeeze on trade credit is also restricting commodities shipments. Around 90% of the world’s $14 trillion (Rs683 trillion) trade is handled via trade credit, the SCI official said.
  “You don’t know the credit worthiness of the guy hiring the ship... The best and the biggest of names are defaulting,” said an executive at Apeejay Shipping Ltd, who too did not want to be named.

Source: Shipowners see business slowing as funds dry up, confidence ebbs

Other recent postings made on the Baltic Dry Index:

1. Views On Current Weakness On Baltic Dry Index

2. The Collapse of the Baltic Dry Index

3. Goldman Downgrades Bulk Shippers!

4. Baltic Dry Index Keeps Falling!

5. Baltic Dry Index Stages Strong Rebound!

6. Baltic Dry Index Set For Strong Recovery???

7. Baltic Dry Index Plunges To Seven Month Lows!

8. The Baltic Dry Index Keeps On Plunging!

9. Baltic Dry Index Continues To Plunge

10.The Plunging Baltic Dry Index And The Dangers Of Using Forward PE!

11. Baltic Dry Plunges Below 2000!!!

12. Admist The Plunging Baltic Dry Index, Dr. Marc Faber Warns That Some Shipping Lines Could Go Bankrupt!